Crisis response and recoveryLinks to our content about crisis responses and recovery work, setting out useful lessons for future events.https://oag.parliament.nz/reports/crisis-responsehttps://oag.parliament.nz/@@site-logo/logo.png
Crisis response and recovery
Links to our content about crisis responses and recovery work, setting out useful lessons for future events.
1 November 2024: In June 2020, we independently reviewed the Ministry of Health’s management of national reserve supplies during the early stages of New Zealand’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic, with a particular focus on personal protective equipment. This letter summarises what we have been told by the Ministry about its progress in implementing our 10 recommendations and sets out our comments.
26 September 2024: In June 2023, we published a report that looked at Auckland Council's preparedness for responding to an emergency. In our follow-up work we found that since the 2023 floods, Auckland Council has made significant steps towards setting up a well-functioning emergency response system, in line with review recommendations. It now needs to focus on ensuring that its new systems and processes are thoroughly tested and practised, and that everybody involved in responding to an emergency is aware of and fully supported to carry out their role.
25 June 2024: We asked the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the National Emergency Management Agency, Te Kawa Mataaho Public Service Commission, and the Ministry of Health (the four organisations) for an update on their response to recommendations we made in 2022 about the co-ordination of the all-of-government response to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 .
28 June 2023: The Auditor-General periodically reviews Auckland Council’s service performance and each of its council-controlled organisations. This time, we reviewed the Council’s disaster resilience and readiness work.
29 March 2023: In emergency response and recovery situations, funding and purchasing decisions often need to be made quickly, while still ensuring transparent and accountable decision-making, getting value for money, and acting lawfully.
13 December 2022: We took an independent look at what happened in 2020, to understand how resources and efforts were co-ordinated as the pandemic unfolded.
31 March 2022: Concerns were raised in the media and our Office about how the Strategic Tourism Assets Protection Programme (STAPP) was managed. Because of these concerns, and the amount of public money involved, we carried out an inquiry into the STAPP eligibility criteria for funding and the process for assessing funding applications.
May 2021: The Wage Subsidy Scheme is the Government's largest single area of spending in response to Covid-19. We carried out a performance audit to review how well the Government has managed the Wage Subsidy Scheme. This report is intended to provide an independent perspective to Parliament and the public and help the public sector prepare for and operate any similar schemes in the future.
June 2020: In April 2020, we agreed with the Ministry of Health to independently review its management of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the early stages of the country’s response to Covid-19. In times of crisis, people need to have trust and confidence in the systems and arrangements set up to support them. We decided that it was important to take an independent look at how the Ministry has been managing both the national reserve of PPE and the supply of PPE during the pandemic.
May 2020: As part of its response to the Christchurch mosque attacks, Parliament introduced a firearms buy-back and amnesty scheme. We examined how effectively and efficiently the Police implemented the scheme.
As we approach the anniversary of the 2010 Canterbury earthquake, we reflect on our work auditing the Canterbury earthquake recovery, and the lessons from Canterbury.
January 2017: In our view, CERA did well early on in the recovery. CERA was also effective in leading a co-ordinated government response to the earthquakes. However, CERA found it challenging to maintain momentum. Its role became less clear as it took on more responsibility for delivering more projects and programmes. CERA did not engage the community well, and struggled to demonstrate its effectiveness and value for money because it had inadequate performance measures and information. It also took a long time for CERA to set up effective systems and controls. CERA’s management controls and performance information needed improvement right up to the time of its disestablishment.
May 2016: We found out that the public entities have made good progress in addressing the recommendations that we made in our 2013 report. SCIRT has made solid progress in repairing damaged pipes and roads. Also, the public entities have improved the governance arrangements over SCIRT. These improvements include clearer roles and responsibilities, more effective guidance and clearer direction to SCIRT, and improvements in reporting.
December 2015: This report looks at the governance arrangements for three projects to rebuild essential facilities in Christchurch: the Bus Interchange, the New Central Library, and the Acute Services Building at Christchurch Hospital. We found that governance was most effective when there was a clear structure and when accountabilities, roles, and responsibilities were well defined and understood. Strong leadership was an important part of effective governance, and being clear about who is accountable for project outcomes supports effective governance.
December 2015: EQC has continued to manage some things well. These include the management of actual repair costs, the management of health and safety, securing reinsurance, and high levels of surveyed customer satisfaction with the quality of repairs immediately on completion of the repairs. Despite the improvements made, EQC could still learn better from complaints and improve its customer focus and interactions.
March 2014: In 2011, we made four recommendations for the Treasury to prepare for potentially large and complex initiatives that might require rapid implementation. The Treasury has responded positively to our recommendations about improving project management and implementing a planning, monitoring, escalation, and reporting framework.
November 2013: The report looks at the arrangement to repair and rebuild the roads and underground water, wastewater, and stormwater pipes in Christchurch. The report examines how effectively and efficiently the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, the New Zealand Transport Agency, and Christchurch City Council are reinstating this “horizontal infrastructure” through an alliance called the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT). SCIRT demonstrates many of the good practice characteristics of alliancing. It is capitalising on its valuable resource of highly trained specialists to develop practical solutions, and project scoping is done well. SCIRT has sound business systems that create operational efficiencies. When relevant variables are considered, SCIRT projects seem reasonably priced ...
October 2013: In our view, the Earthquake Commission's (EQC) performance to date has been mixed. It has performed well in managing repair costs and setting the home-repair programme up quickly, but has not performed as well in dealing with homeowners. Although efficiency is clearly important, this report is a timely reminder for EQC and others that being in the public service means serving the needs of people ...
October 2012: This report provides an objective view of how the Canterbury earthquake recovery is being run. It describes how the recovery is being carried out, the roles of agencies, how the recovery is being funded, and what the main risks and challenges are - for the agencies involved and for Cantabrians.
September 2011: We carried out a performance audit of the Treasury's implementation and management of the Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme, given the Scheme's significance for our economy at the time and the amount of money involved...
October 2003: In this audit, we set out to provide assurance to Parliament and the public that threats to domestic security are being adequately managed. Our unique mandate as auditor of the public sector enabled us to examine the wide range of arrangements in place to identify and respond to domestic security threats...
November 2002: In this report we assessed how MAF manages terrestrial biosecurity risks. We also examined seven case studies as illustrations of MAF’s application of biosecurity risk policies and procedures, and identified areas where we think improvements can be made...
Ministry of Health: Management of personal protective equipment in response to Covid-19 follow-up
