Part 6: Approaches to public accountability are always changing

Public accountability: A matter of trust and confidence.

The effectiveness of any public accountability process will be limited if it does not reflect what the public expects of the public sector.

In many countries, rapid changes in technology, the environment, global connections and access to public information, media platforms, and cultural and social diversity are taking place. These changes will not only define what the public sector looks like in the 21st century but will also establish new notions of public trust and challenging traditional approaches to public accountability.

How public accountability changes over time

The priorities, procedures, and practices of the public accountability system reflect and respond to what Smyth observes is a "dynamic social relationship through which civil society seeks to control and challenge the state".132

The public accountability system must adapt to changing public expectations to maintain the public's trust and confidence. Wille therefore argues that "[t]he accountability landscape should not be treated as a static structure".133

In discussing how the public accountability system changes, Dowdle observes that it is not so much created through a series of "core conceptual principles" but as continuous refinements to the features of an existing system and, from time to time, more significant paradigm shifts.134

Approaches to public accountability have changed throughout history. These changes can occur quite suddenly or build up for many decades.135

For example, Lupson notes that, in the 11th century, the Domesday Book allowed King William I to establish a new and significant accountability relationship with all English landowners. They "were now accountable to him as loyal subjects, bound by an oath of allegiance, and William I knew for what they were accountable".136 Smyth observes that, in the 19th century, the United Kingdom saw a significant shift towards citizen-centred democratic accountability through "a major extension of the right to vote and thereby the ability to hold the government of the day to account".137

More recently, post-war systems of democratic and bureaucratic accountability changed again. Haque observes that, in developing countries after the Second World War:

the forces and processes of democratization in different parts of the world, led to the institutionalization of democratic norms, especially citizens' rights and public interest, as the guiding principles of public accountability.138

In New Zealand, significant system-wide changes to public accountability were last made during the reform of the public management system in the 1980s. These reforms were in many ways similar to those made in other countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia.

In New Zealand in the 1980s, many saw the public sector as inefficient, unresponsive, and increasingly ineffective. To address these issues of competence, the reforms emphasised ideas such as public choice, self-interest, decentralisation, market-led service delivery, and non-intervention.

The objective of the public sector became economic growth, competition, efficiency, and economy.139 In response, public accountability mechanisms focused on performance, responsiveness, quality, outputs, and results.

The Treasury's 1987 briefing to the incoming government observed that "Systems of accountability and incentives have not adapted over time to encourage the most efficient and most effective public service."140

Several proposals were made, including improving parliamentary scrutiny, better monitoring arrangements, and stronger management incentives for good performance. At the time, the Treasury considered that effective management systems were crucial "if the electorate is to have confidence that its interests are being pursued by the Government".141

Critical to the reforms' ability to improve public sector performance were a clear separation of the provider and purchaser and a focus on accountability for performance.142 Rather than as citizens, the public was treated more as customers with rights to services and information only.143

Smyth describes the international reforms as a "clash" of systems144 where new "managerialist forms of accountability" challenged traditional notions of democratic accountability.145 For Parker and Gould, the reforms substantially reoriented public accountability inwards to improve organisational performance and away from Parliament and the public.146

Mulgan observes that, although the reforms strengthened parliamentary scrutiny compared with other countries, there was a "lack of interest in improving accountability directly to members of the public who use public services".147

For many countries, focusing on public sector performance was warranted and still is today. However, some researchers have questioned whether this focus has been overemphasised at the expense of other public sector management and public accountability objectives.

For example, Houston and others suggest that the 1980s reforms were "promoted and adopted without first developing a sound understanding about what influences citizen attitudes."148 Behn asks "[h]as performance become so important that we have begun to ignore our concerns for finances and fairness?"149 For Behn, finances in this context mean whether "agencies handle our tax dollars with care".150

Norman saw the 1980s reforms as taking too much of a "one-dimensional, simplified approach to management control issues" with a "[s]ingle minded focus on the achievement of goals". He believed that the challenge for the public sector would be to balance the multiple and competing sets of values that would arise as the ideals and the focus of the public management system changed.151

From a public accountability perspective, the 1980s reforms were built on the presumption that improved public sector performance, when reviewed and publicly reported, would inevitably generate greater public trust and confidence. Among other things, this reinforced the value of auditing the reporting of that performance.

The public audit explosion

Independent public sector auditing has been an important part of good public management and accountability since the 1860s. Although the practice of auditing existed earlier, Bunn observes that, in the United Kingdom and Australia during the 19th century, "[t]he role of the Auditor-General changed from providing an administrative function for Executive government to that of an independent officer of Parliament operating as a check on Executive government".152

The 1980s reforms reinforced the importance of the public audit function. Grube states that, as a result of the reforms, public officials were increasingly held directly accountable for management and administrative mistakes.153 Combined with the greater autonomy and profile of public officials and their agencies, this meant that more specialist institutions were needed to monitor, review, and report on agency performance and the disclosure of information.

The expansion of these specialist institutions, particularly in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, has been referred to by researchers as an "audit explosion". For example, in New Zealand, the Education Review Office was established in 1989 to review school performance and the Crown Company Monitoring Unit was established in 1993 to monitor various Crown entities, including State-owned enterprises, health provider companies, and Crown Research Institutes.154 Norman observed that the Office of the Auditor-General became the "single and most feared and respected agency".155

Power perceived this "audit explosion" as a "major shift in power: from the public to the professional, and from teachers, engineers and managers to overseers".156

New auditing approaches for holding the public sector to account were also introduced at that time. As Karakatsanis notes, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in the 1970s were not equipped with the right audit tools and methodologies, and faced "an accountability model that escaped their traditional mandates".157

In response, the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) introduced "performance auditing", which was an approach "designed to ensure that governments are spending public money with due regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness". From the late 1980s, performance auditing became an established part of an SAI's toolkit.

In New Zealand, the public audit function extended into some aspects of honesty and reliability of public officials and public organisations. For example, the Auditor-General's Auditing Standard 3 requires auditors to consider how well public organisations and their public officials have met Parliament's and the public's expectations of an appropriate standard of behaviour (probity).158 The Auditor-General is also able to inquire into the conduct of any public organisation.

Ultimately, Bringselius observes that "society decides which values it wants audited".159 Duits also argues that, as societies constantly change, "the factors driving the demand for audit may be subject to change".160

Today's changing society and its implications

In many countries, including New Zealand, the "dynamic social relationship" continues as public expectations and the public sector interact and adjust to more information, greater interconnectedness, changing technologies and media platforms, global challenges (such as climate change), and changing attitudes, ethnicities, and demographics.

In response to these trends, public sectors have already made changes to improve public management systems and there is more concern for ethics, collaboration and social outcomes. 161 Citizen-centred outcomes, such as the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, have also become popular ways of measuring, directing, and reporting on government activities and results.

Many of the changes made to date have improved the way the public sector manages and delivers public services in a more diverse, dynamic, and connected society. However, public accountability systems have received less attention and still retain many of the features from the 1980s reforms. These include a strong focus on performance and monitoring, hierarchical relationships with well-defined lines of managerial accountability, and an ongoing view that the public is a customer rather than a citizen.

As the public sector moves into a world where greater public accountability is expected, continuing to rely on traditional approaches might not be enough. For example, Lægreid observes that public accountability relationships may need to become more dynamic and multidimensional. 162 In other words, to be effective in a connected, informed, and diverse world, public accountability might need to have structures and processes that can meet multiple, and sometimes fluid, public relationships and expectations.

Below, we consider some of the changes taking place and what the literature tells us about what they could mean for public accountability and maintaining public trust and confidence in the 21st century.

Greater interconnectedness

New ways of building public trust and confidence might be needed when the public is more connected in real time.

Botsman argues that, in an increasingly digital and connected society, how the public establishes trust is becoming less institutionalised and more individualised through distributed networks of individuals.163 Although the questions about trust might remain the same (for example, who are you? is your information reliable? will you do what you say?), establishing trust with a wide network of online strangers is based on immediate reputational feedback mechanisms rather than traditional processes, intermediaries, and institutions.164

New businesses are increasingly placing the reputational feedback mechanism at the centre of their business models. For example, ride-share platform Uber relies on a feedback system for drivers and customers to manage the behaviour of both parties and enable access to the platform.

During times of crisis, different approaches might be needed to interact and engage with a more connected public. For example, a study of a simulated bioterrorist attack in the United States found that pre-existing biases against governmental health and safety agencies mean that the public can ignore traditional sources of expert advice and seek "... their own public health information from mass and social media ...". 165

As a result, the public tended to perceive that the risks of an attack were higher than they actually were and expected service responses to reflect those perceptions. The researchers suggested that response agencies need additional accountability mechanisms to reflect public preferences and attitudes, rather than relying only on the scientific evidence.166

Fergusson also warns that increased interconnectedness has led to a greater polarisation of public views and perspectives.167 We were told that this could mean the public sector is required to serve, and be accountable to, increasingly divided communities.

Maintaining a positive public reputation or brand with a wider set of audiences is increasingly important in a more connected, polarised, and individualised world. Busuioc and Lodge observe that many individuals and organisations are doing more than their mandatory accountability requirements because the way they present themselves and are perceived by wider audiences matters.

In a more connected world, public accountability might be less about reactive control and compliance, and more about proactively maintaining a positive reputation or organisational brand.168 This aligns with what Botsman has said about the evolution of trust, which has many implications for how public accountability is thought about and approached today.

More transparency and information

Today, through channels such as New Zealand's Official Information Act 1982 and the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, more information is available to be aggregated, distributed, scrutinised, and used within and outside the public sector. However, O'Neill warns that simply focusing on greater transparency can often lead to more confusion, uncertainty, and mistrust when, for example, too much information is provided or the information is evasive or uninformative.169

The internet, mobile technologies, and social media platforms are creating new opportunities and challenges for the public sector in how to communicate with the public.

Sarah Castel and others surveyed 18- to 35-year-olds about the United Kingdom government's response to the "iPod generation". They found that the survey respondents:

... skilfully use new technology to simplify information and to entertain them … [and] … are waiting for government and politicians to surprise them with more innovative and exciting ways of getting information across to them.170

Lindquist and Huse recently reviewed the accountability and monitoring of the Canadian government. They found that, although there was greater access to public information, there was little evidence that technology had improved the amount and quality of oversight. As a result, they observed various tensions emerging.171 For example:

  • Long-held expectations of better services and more accountability through greater information and technology are still to be realised.
  • Governments wanting to be transparent and open are finding this difficult while also trying to control the accuracy, audience, and agenda.
  • Different interactive, dynamic, and citizen-driven accountability mechanisms are emerging that have implications for traditional vertical and horizontal accountability structures.

Lindquist and Huse suggest that, where vast amounts of data and information is available, more research is needed into new "modes" of accountability. In particular:172

  • how accountability information is supplied and used;
  • how the public could participate more in budgeting and monitoring processes;
  • how parliamentary scrutiny and internal oversight processes could be improved;
  • new ways of visualising data for management and accountability purposes; and
  • emerging multi-dimensional or hybrid approaches to accountability.

Changing media platforms

Traditional media plays an important role in informing the public about what is happening in their world. Klijn and Koppenjan have referred to the media as the "watchdog of democracy".173

However, in the last few decades, the media has been fundamentally changed by the internet, new technologies, and competition for revenue in a shrinking and increasingly fragmented market. Social media channels that share content, rather than those that produce it, receive the most attention and financial benefit through advertising revenues.174

The consequences of these changes have been serious for media institutions and have significantly affected how well informed certain communities are. In 2018, Abernathy observed that the decline of local media has led to the rise of "news deserts" – communities that do not have local news coverage.

Abernathy found that "between 1,300 and 1,400 communities that had newspapers of their own in 2004 now have no local news coverage at all". She also observed that those with the least access to local news "are often the most vulnerable – the poorest, least educated and most isolated".175

At the same time, the rise of the internet, social media, and new technologies has made it significantly easier for misinformation and "fake news" to spread. Traditional media is finding it harder to compete as people increasingly seek out information that aligns with their views, regardless of whether it is accurate. Kevin Kelly, co-founder of Wired magazine, said that "truth is no longer dictated by authorities, but is networked by peers. For every fact there is a counterfact. All those counterfacts and facts look identical online, which is confusing to most people."176

Iyengar and Hahn, in discussing mass media and its implications, observed that as:

increasing numbers of Americans fall outside the reach of the news, they become both less informed about current affairs and more susceptible to the persuasive appeals of political elites.177

What represents "news" has also changed in derivation, emphasis, format, and frequency. Tony Blair, in talking about public life and the media, observed:

The news schedule is now 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It moves in real time. Papers don't give you up to date news. That's already out there. They have to break stories, try to lead the schedules. Or they give a commentary. And it all happens with outstanding speed.178

These changes to the way news is created and sold has transformed the relationship between the public sector and the media. As Blair noted, for politicians and senior public officials, a large part of the job:

as big as anything else – is coping with the media, its sheer scale, weight and constant hyperactivity Frequently the problem is as much assembling the facts as giving them. Make a mistake and you quickly transfer from drama into crisis.179

Fisher observes that government and the media are complicit in creating an adverse relationship where the public could suffer because of a lack of facts.180

The New Zealand Media Council argues that the role of the independent professional news media is more important than ever.181 However, Google New Zealand reminds us that the internet provides a much broader toolbox to achieve many of the democratic functions of the press. Google observes "[w]hile the traditional media remains a way to ‘represent the public', new media allows the public to represent themselves".182 Although this view is important, others have highlighted the need for it to be weighed against potentially negative ethical and privacy implications of these new media platforms.183

Although the public sector has cautiously embraced new technologies and forms of social media,184 the pervasiveness of the media's influence on the public means that the public sector needs to be able to work with and leverage this evolving relationship.

Greater cultural diversity

Jordan argues that, although accountability might be a universal desire for most people, this does not automatically lead to a universal way of approaching and establishing accountability.185

Bouckaert and Van de Walle also observe that "[t]he factors determining trust in government are not necessarily the same for every country or political culture".186 These differences can have important implications for how effectively public accountability can be established in diverse societies.

Jordan observes clear differences between "western" and "non-western" ways of establishing accountability. She looked at two non-western approaches to accountability. The common theme was a focus on collective or community accountability and a closeness between the "ruler and the ruled". In other words, "a leader does not lead the community as such, but guides it from within".187 This was distinguished from western approaches to accountability, which focus on the individual and the separation of the respective parties.

Prescott, Masoe, and Chiang observe that, in Pacific Island communities, traditional approaches to accountability are also more collective and community based, with a " ... broad interpretation of accountability compared with tha[t] commonly held in the west."188 Among other things, the authors note that accountability relationships can be more informal or oral, and consequences such as a gain or loss of reputation within the community are sometimes more important than any financial reward or sanction.

For example, Dar studied how western and non-western accountabilities collide in post-colonial India – in particular, the accountability relationship between international donor organisations and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). He found that the donor's requirements for reporting in English suppressed local knowledge and led to workers experiencing a sense of disempowerment. It also prevented local NGOs and other stakeholders from establishing an informed and trusting relationship.189

Greater cultural diversity can also offer opportunities to improve public accountability systems and relationships between governments and different cultures. For example, in 2017, the Institute on Governance in Canada considered a new accountability framework to support improved relationships between the government and its indigenous peoples. This framework moved away from:

a paternalistic, compliance-based model that most closely resembles an agent-principal relationship towards a more mutual, reciprocal model, based on a nation-to-nation, government-to-government relationship.190

An important element of the new framework was that indigenous governments were primarily accountable to their people. Other important elements were reciprocal principles, such as fairness and sharing responsibility and accountability for outcomes.191

A special relationship with Māori

In New Zealand, the Crown has a special relationship with Māori that began when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840. However, throughout the country and over time, a range of Treaty breaches have harmed this relationship.192 As we stated in Part 4, Māori trust in the public sector is currently lower than other ethnic groups.

A new Māori/Crown Relations portfolio has recently been created to support the Crown, uphold the Treaty of Waitangi, improve outcomes for Māori, establish closer partnerships between Māori and the Crown, and create opportunities for economic development.193

Being properly accountable for that partnership will be an important part of ensuring that the relationship is resilient and sustainable. Understanding the expectations of all parties, and particularly what the Māori community expect, is an essential first step.

As with other non-western approaches, accountability in tikanga Māori is highly contextual and reflects cultural relationships that are more collective than individual, involves more direct avenues, and has a mix of formal and informal mechanisms.

In one study, Boulton interviewed Māori who provided mental health services throughout New Zealand about their experiences. The responses included:

  • Dealing with multiple and collective accountabilities is a normal part of Māori society and not considered problematic.
  • Accountability is not achieved through a single event and can take place at community meetings (hui), face to face (kanohi ki te kanohi), as part of the "kumara vine" (informal channels), through shame (whakamā), and through genealogy (whakapapa).
  • Accountability is regarded as a relationship that flows both ways – it is reciprocal rather than hierarchical and one way.
  • Accountability measures should reflect the work that is valued – these are more outcomes related than output based.
  • Accountability to the community is a positive motivating force that encourages people to go that one step further.
  • There is a need to know the person or people you are accountable to – a contract is not enough.194

Other literature shows that important elements include focusing on prevention, transparency, and building trust and relationships through kinship (whanaungatanga).195

Māori perspectives on public accountability differ in many ways from what is sometimes referred to as the "western" approach. To fully understand these differences, we must first ask what accountability to Māori would look like.196 This will help achieve a more relevant public accountability system and allow stronger and more durable relationships with Māori in a post-Treaty settlement world.

Improving the relationship between Māori and the Crown is an important part of the recently announced State sector reforms. In the next Part, we discuss how these reforms might affect the public accountability system.

132: Smyth, S (2007), "Public accountability: A critical approach", Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services, Vol 6 No 2, page 33.

133: Wille, A, "The dynamics of the EU accountability landscape: Moving to an ever denser union", in Christensen, T, and Lægreid, P (2017), The Routledge handbook to accountability and welfare state reforms in Europe, Routledge, page 281.

134: Dowdle, M (2006), "Public accountability: Conceptual, historical, and epistemic mappings", Regulatory theory: foundations and applications, ANU Press, page 202.

135: Smyth, S (July 2013), "Rediscovering democratic accountability: The history of an awful idea", CMS Conference, Manchester, pages 12-15.

136: Lupson, J (2007), A phenomenographic study of British civil servants' conceptions of accountability, PhD Thesis, Cranfield University, page 41.

137: Smyth, S (2013), "Rediscovering democratic accountability: The history of an awful idea", CMS Conference, Manchester, July 2013, page 21.

138: Haque, M S (2007), "Limits of public accountability under the reinvented state in developing nations", Public Administration Quarterly, Vol 31 No 3/4, page 436.

139: Haque, M S (2007), "Limits of public accountability under the reinvented state in developing nations", Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 31 No.3/4, page 432.

140: The Treasury (1987), Government management: Briefing to incoming government, Volume 1, chapter 2, page 50.

141: The Treasury (1987), Government management: Briefing to incoming government, Volume 1, chapter 2, page 54.

142: Stewart, J and Walsh, K (1992), "Change in management of public services", Public Administration, Vol 70 No 4, pages 504-508.

143: Stewart, J and Walsh, K (1992), "Change in management of public services", Public Administration, Vol 70 No 4, page 507.

144: Smyth, S (July 2013), "Rediscovering democratic accountability: The history of an awful idea", CMS conference, Manchester, page 3.

145: Smyth, S (July 2013), "Rediscovering democratic accountability: The history of an awful idea", CMS conference, Manchester, pages 3 and 30.

146: Parker, L and Gould, G (1999), "Changing public sector accountability: Critiquing new directions", Accounting Forum, Vol 23 No 2, pages 123-125 and 130.

147: Mulgan, R (2004), "Public sector reform in New Zealand: Issues of public accountability", Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government Discussion Paper 04/03, page 6.

148: Houston, D, Aitalieva, N, Morelock, A, and Shults, C (2016), "Citizen trust in civil servants: A cross-national examination", International Journal of Public Administration, DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2016.1156696, page 2.

149: Behn, R (2001), Rethinking democratic accountability, Brookings Institution Press, page 38.

150: Behn, R (2001), Rethinking democratic accountability, Brookings Institution Press, page 39.

151: Norman, R (2003), Obedient servants? Management freedoms and accountabilities in the New Zealand public sector, Victoria University Press, pages 195, 220, and 233.

152: Bunn, M (January 2017), "The development of public sector audit independence: The colonial experience in Western Australia", PhD thesis, Curtin University, page 2.

153: Grube, D (July 2015), "Responsibility to be enthusiastic? Public servants and the public face of ‘promiscuous partisanship'", Governance, Vol 28, Issue 3, pages 1 and 5.

154: Reddy, K (2010), The relationship between corporate governance practices and financial performance in New Zealand: An empirical investigation, PhD thesis, University of Waikato, page 91.

155: Norman, R (2003), Obedient servants? Management freedoms and accountabilities in the New Zealand public sector, Victoria University Press, page 167.

156: Power, M (1994), The audit explosion, Demos, pages 2 and 38.

157: Karakatsanis, G (March 2015), "The notion of accountability in a changing public sector and the curious case of the European Union", Journal – European Court of Auditors, No 03/2015, page 10.

158: The Office of the Auditor-General (2017), AG-3 Effectiveness and efficiency, waste and a lack of probity or financial prudence.

159: Bringselius, L (2018), "Efficiency economy and effectiveness but what about ethics? Supreme audit institutions at a critical juncture", Public Money and Management, Vol 38 No 2, page 105.

160: Duits, H (2012), The added value of auditing in a non-mandatory environment, Amsterdam University Press, page 48.

161: Duncan, G and Chapman, J (2010), "New millennium, new public management and the New Zealand model", The Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol 69 No 3, page 312.

162: Lægreid, P (2014), "Accountability and new public management", in Bovens, M, Goodin, R, and Schillemans, T, The Oxford handbook of public accountability, Oxford University Press, page 329.

163: Botsman, R (November 2017), "Trust in 2030 – From institutions to individuals", World Economic Forum, Annual Meeting of the Global Future Councils.

164: Thierer, A, Koopman, C, Hobson, A, and Kuiper, C (January 2016), "How the internet, the sharing economy, and reputational feedback mechanisms solve the ‘lemons problem'" University of Miami Law Review, pages 832, 833, 841, and 858.

165: Malet, D and Korbitz, M (2014), "Accountability between experts and the public in times of risk", Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol 73 No 4, abstract, page 491.

166: Malet, D and Korbitz, M (2014), "Accountability between experts and the public in times of risk", Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol 73 No 4, pages 492 and 494.

167: Ferguson, N (2017), "The false prophecy of hyperconnection", Foreign Affairs, September/October 2017 issue, page 71.

168: Busuioc, M and Lodge, M (April 2016), "The reputational basis of public accountability", LSE Research Online, pages 2, 3, 7, and 10-22.

169: O'Neill, O (2002), "Lecture 4: Trust and transparency", Reith lectures: A question of trust, BBC, page 19 of transcript.

170: Castell, S, Sweet, O, Haldenby, A, and Parsons, L (2008), A new reality: Government and the iPod generation, IPSOS MORI, pages 9 and 34.

171: Lindquist, E and Huse, I (2017), "Accountability and monitoring government in the digital era: Promise, realism and research for digital-era governance", Canadian Public Administration, Vol 60 No 4, pages 645-646.

172: Lindquist, E and Huse, I (2017), "Accountability and monitoring government in the digital era: Promise, realism and research for digital-era governance", Canadian Public Administration, Vol 60 No 4, pages 644, 646-648.

173: Klijn, E and Koppenjan, J (2014), "Accountable networks", in Bovens, M, Goodin, R, and Schillemans, T, The Oxford handbook of public accountability, Oxford University Press, page 249.

174: Myllylahti, M (2018), Google, Facebook and New Zealand news media: The problem of platform dependency, Auckland University of Technology, page 6.

175: Abernathy, P (2018), The expanding news desert, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, pages 5, 9, and 11.

176: Kelly, K (2017), "Lies, propaganda and fake news: A challenge for our age", BBC Future Now article by Richard Grey, 1 March 2017.

177: Iyengar, S and Hahn K (2008), The political economy of mass media: Implications for informed citizenship, Stanford University Political Communications Lab Research Paper, page 30.

178: Blair, T (2007), "Lecture by the Prime Minister the Right Honourable Tony Blair MP on public life", 10 Downing Street press notice, 12 June 2007, pages 2-3.

179: Blair, T (2007), "Lecture by the Prime Minister the Right Honourable Tony Blair MP on public life", 10 Downing Street press notice, 12 June 2007, page 3.

180: Fisher, J (2010), "Tony Blair's lecture on public life and the media: Functional applications for business and research", Competition Forum, page 315.

181: The Law Commission (March 2013), Report 128 on "The news media meets ‘new media', page 59.

182: The Law Commission (March 2013), Report 128 on "The news media meets ‘new media', page 59.

183: For example, see "Two cents' worth: Raw power in the internet era" (March 2019), a Newsroom and Radio New Zealand podcast by Bernard Hickey at

184: Office of the Auditor-General (2013), Learning from public entities' use of social media, page 5.

185: Jordan, S (2011), "Accountability in two non-western contexts", in Dubnick, M and Frederickson, H, Accountable governance: Problems and promises, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, page 241.

186: Bouckaert, G and Van de Walle, S (2003), Comparing measures of citizen trust and user satisfaction as indicators of ‘good governance': Difficulties in linking trust and satisfaction indicators, page 6.

187: Jordan, S (2011), "Accountability in two non-western contexts", in Dubnick, M and Frederickson, H, Accountable governance: Problems and promises, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, pages 251-252.

188: Prescott, S, Masoe, A, and Chiang, C (2010), "The concept of accountability in the Pacific: The case of Tonga", 2010 APIRA conference paper, page 11.

189: Dar, S (2013), Hybrid accountabilities: When western and non-western accountabilities collide, Sage publications, abstract and page 18.

190: Institute on Governance (2017), Review of accountability and mutual accountability frameworks, final report submitted to the Assembly of First Nations and the Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Canada, May 2017, page 2.

191: Institute on Governance (2017), Review of accountability and mutual accountability frameworks, final report submitted to the Assembly of First Nations and the Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Canada, May 2017, page 12.

192: Office of the Minister for Crown/Māori Relations (2018), "Initial scope of Crown/Māori Relations portfolio", New Zealand Cabinet paper, paragraph 3.

193: Office of the Minister for Crown/Māori Relations (2018), "Initial scope of Crown/Māori Relations portfolio", New Zealand Cabinet paper, paragraphs 7-12.

194: Boulton, A F (2005), Provision at the interface: The Māori mental health contracting experience, PhD thesis, Massey University, pages i and 157-162.

195: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (June 2018), Universal periodic review – New Zealand draft report (final draft), page 8.

196: Jacobs, K (2000), "Evaluating accountability: Finding a place for the Treaty of Waitangi in the New Zealand public sector", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol 13 No 3, page 376.