Part 4: Meeting settlement responsibilities

How public organisations are fulfilling Treaty settlements.

4.1
Over time, public organisations have become responsible for more – and more complex – settlement redress. We wanted to know how well public organisations were set up to fulfil their settlement responsibilities.

4.2
We expected public organisations to give adequate priority and focus to their settlement responsibilities. This includes clearly assigning internal responsibility for planning, identifying any challenges or barriers to meeting their commitments, and making changes to their internal arrangements where needed. We also expected public organisations to have good internal knowledge of their progress in providing redress, through fit-for-purpose monitoring.

4.3
We found that the internal arrangements in many of the public organisations we spoke with did not consistently support them to meet their commitments in a timely and effective way. Although we saw some examples of good practice, all of the public organisations we looked at had difficulties meeting some of their commitments.

4.4
To consistently meet commitments, public organisations need to consider whether their current approaches are suitable.

4.5
Most public organisations we looked at did not have adequate systems to keep track of their progress. This makes it difficult to understand the risks to their ability to meet their commitments or to escalate a risk before it becomes a settlement issue.

4.6
We know that public organisations have a range of other responsibilities, and that providing settlement redress might make up only a small part of their wider work. However, settlement commitments are contractual and legal obligations. Any failure to meet them should be unacceptable.

4.7
When public organisations do not provide redress as intended, post-settlement governance entities, iwi, and hapū miss significant economic and social opportunities to benefit from the redress. The renewed relationship that the settlement seeks to establish is also undermined.

4.8
Issues with providing redress also create financial, reputational, and litigation risks for the public sector. We discuss this further in paragraphs 6.26-6.34.

Existing systems might need to be adapted

4.9
Most public organisations we spoke with integrate their settlement commitments into the responsibilities, work plans, and programmes of existing teams with relevant technical expertise. These teams use existing systems and processes to manage the organisation's commitments alongside their other priorities. For example:

A specialised property team might manage commitments involving land redress alongside other commercial property management.
Teams with other regulatory responsibilities might manage councils' regulatory commitments (such as statutory acknowledgements or arrangements to consult on consenting applications).⁴³

4.10
Many public organisations that we spoke with also have centralised Māori outcomes or Māori engagement teams that support technical teams. Their roles include brokering and managing relationships with post-settlement governance entities, resolving settlement issues, and/or monitoring the progress of settlement redress throughout the organisation.

4.11
Although it makes sense to delegate redress responsibilities to existing teams, public organisations must also consider whether they need to adapt their existing systems and processes to fulfil their settlement commitments.

4.12
We saw some examples of organisations doing this. For example, rather than send bulk emails of consent applications to all post-settlement governance entities in the region, Auckland Council has developed an online portal that allows post-settlement governance entities to filter consent applications of relevance to them.

4.13
Other examples of public organisations adapting their usual approaches include public organisations partnering with post-settlement governance entities to provide services, organising secondments between them and post-settlement governance entities, hiring additional dedicated staff to build capability, and setting up specific teams to handle property redress associated with settlements.

4.14
However, public organisations that did not change their standard approaches sometimes had issues meeting commitments.

4.15
For example, two councils that we looked at are parties to an integrated planning protocol as part of the Tūhoe settlement. This protocol sets out a framework for engaging with Te Uru Taumatua about planning matters.

4.16
Bay of Plenty Regional Council took a tailored approach to engaging with Te Uru Taumatua. It set up a working relationship that allowed it to implement the protocol in a way that would work for Te Uru Taumatua.

4.17
In contrast, Hawke's Bay Regional Council invited Te Uru Taumatua to join an existing committee of eight other post-settlement governance entities from throughout the Hawke's Bay region.

4.18
Te Uru Taumatua chose not to participate in the Hawke's Bay Regional Council's forum because of the time it took to travel to the Hawke's Bay and because the agenda did not focus adequately on issues relevant to Tūhoe.

4.19
When we wrote this report, Hawke's Bay Regional Council had not found an alternative means of engaging with Te Uru Taumatua to implement the protocol. Hawke's Bay Regional Council told us that it intends to renew engagement with Te Uru Taumatua to resolve the issue.

Public organisations do not always recognise the complexity involved in meeting commitments

4.20
We saw instances where public organisations underestimated the complexity of meeting specific commitments or where they did not plan for complexity well.

4.21
For example, Land Information New Zealand is responsible for Crown forestry licensed land redress under several settlements. This involves transferring both Crown forestry licences and the associated rental fees collected from the forester (which usually must happen soon after settlement). It also involves transferring the title to the underlying Crown forestry licensed land (which usually must happen within five years).

4.22
Land Information New Zealand transfers Crown forestry licences and accumulated rentals soon after settlement day. However, since 2020, there have been at least 23 instances, relating to 14 settlements, where Crown forestry licensed land titles were not transferred within the five-year statutory time frame.

4.23
We were told that the statutory time frame was intended to allow Land Information New Zealand time to work through the technical complexities of transferring these titles. This included working through the overlapping interests of different iwi and hapū, making sure any dependent commitments were met, completing any necessary surveys, and preparing legal documentation to give effect to the transfer.

4.24
The statutory time frame was also intended to account for any unforeseen delays outside of Land Information New Zealand's control.

4.25
Land Information New Zealand acknowledged that when it had not transferred title on time, it had started the transfer process too late. It said that it had initially believed that five years was enough time. It later realised that it had underestimated the time needed to establish relationships, sort out easements, and organise all legal documentation.

4.26
Land Information New Zealand had also not anticipated how complex it would be to transfer title to multiple post-settlement governance entities (which sometimes needed surveys to separate ownership between multiple entities) and to transfer easements. Some delays were also outside of its control – for example, because post-settlement governance entities were not ready to receive title.

4.27
Land Information New Zealand has made progress with these outstanding transfers. As of March 2025, nine outstanding Crown forestry licensed land title transfers, relating to 12 settlements, breach the five-year statutory time frame.

4.28
Three of these transfers, for forest land at the top of the South Island, are currently unable to be progressed because of ongoing litigation between the Attorney-General and some of the iwi who have settled in that area. Two others have also been affected by delays caused by more routine court processes – for example, to approve a right-of-way easement.

4.29
Land Information New Zealand told us that it has also changed how it carries out these transfers. It also told us that it has completed transfers for more recent settlements within the five-year time frame.

4.30
Underestimating what is involved in fulfilling complex redress or failing to adequately plan for commitments was a theme repeated in our discussions with public organisations. We saw examples of public organisations:

not planning for high volumes of time-bound land transfers;
not advising post-settlement governance entities that land was available for purchase within statutory time frames; and
not carrying out the due diligence work needed to determine whether land was available for a post-settlement governance entity to purchase.

4.31
In these instances, public organisations were not able to meet these commitments as intended – or at all – when post-settlement governance entities sought to trigger them. As a result, both parties needed to invest considerable time and resources to agree a solution.

4.32
We also saw evidence of public organisations struggling to provide various types of redress – both with mechanisms that have been in use for 30 years and with newer bespoke arrangements. This speaks to public organisations' ability to learn from experience and improve over time, including by adapting their existing approaches to account for the complexity involved in fulfilling settlement commitments.

4.33
In our view, it also highlights the importance of public organisations understanding their performance through adequate monitoring and reporting. Having effective accountability processes to address poor performance (which we discuss later in this Part and in Part 6) and to share good practice is equally important.

4.34
We also saw evidence that public organisations tend to overestimate post-settlement governance entities' capability and capacity. For example, we were told that newer and/or smaller post-settlement governance entities may not be equipped to engage with complex government processes. We were also told that post-settlement governance entities' personnel and priorities change over time.

4.35
Post-settlement governance entities can be small and have fewer resources than public organisations. This is a key reason why we consider it important for public organisations to take the time needed to build meaningful relationships with post-settlement governance entities. Public organisations also need to co-ordinate with one another effectively to make it easier for post-settlement governance entities to engage with them.

Many public organisations do not understand the costs involved

4.36
In our interviews, we were told that public organisations find it difficult to resource fulfilling commitments from existing baselines.

4.37
Different forms of redress need different funding arrangements. Some redress needs one-off time-bound funding, such as paying financial redress. Other commitments need public organisations to dedicate long-term or ongoing resources (for example, to plan for post-settlement governance entities' longer-term rights to purchase properties, relationship agreements, consultation on strategy and planning processes, or co-governance arrangements).

4.38
One council we spoke to observed that engagement costs are variable and tend to fluctuate with the nature of the relationship over time.

4.39
Greater Wellington Regional Council told us that it had recently shifted its funding approach to better support its partnering with iwi organisations, including post-settlement governance entities.

4.40
The Council told us that it had previously provided funding for fixed or one-off events associated with engaging with iwi, such as meetings. However, this had not been enough to cover the breadth of engagement needed to "truly partner" with post-settlement governance entities.

4.41
It was now shifting to a model that involved partnering with mana whenua on shared projects to achieve specific outcomes (including developing capacity and co-designing and co-planning regulatory matters), which requires significantly more funding to support.

4.42
Most public organisations we spoke with told us that they did not have budgets to support iwi to engage with their processes. They said that they found it difficult to resource redress that has ongoing costs, such as co-governance and co-management arrangements.

4.43
Interviewees from each of the four councils we looked at emphasised that responsibilities generated by settlements are not always accompanied by additional resourcing or other support from central government.

4.44
This issue has been mentioned elsewhere. For example, in 2019, the Productivity Commission reported that some councils were struggling to meet the costs of fulfilling their settlement commitments. The Commission also said that funding issues remaining unresolved could risk some settlement arrangements' durability and effectiveness.

4.45
The Productivity Commission recommended that there be comprehensive, independent, and in-depth analysis of costs associated with fulfilling settlement commitments – both "to councils and to iwi".⁴⁴ This recommendation does not appear to have been addressed.⁴⁵

4.46
However, we saw evidence that some public organisations were carrying out analysis to understand the costs of meeting their commitments. For example, Bay of Plenty Regional Council has costed what is required to meet specific commitments for several settlements.

4.47
In our view, work of this kind is crucial. The durability of settlements relies on public organisations with settlement commitments meeting their legal and contractual responsibilities to provide redress. To that end, they must resource and manage responsibilities deriving from settlement legislation in the same way as they do all legislative compliance tasks.

Some public organisations are trying to improve their internal arrangements

4.48
In our audit, we saw evidence of public organisations seeking to improve how they set themselves up to meet their settlement commitments.

4.49
Land Information New Zealand recently carried out a restructure to ensure that its specialised support staff (the Crown Māori Relations Group) and the staff responsible for transferring land redress (in the Crown Property Group) work together on settlements more closely and report to the same Kaihautū/Deputy Secretary.

4.50
Land Information New Zealand told us that this new structure has improved the way it engages with post-settlement governance entities. It said it has also improved how it manages and monitors its commitments.

4.51
Greater Wellington Regional Council told us that it had started a priority project to assess its accountability and its reporting, policies, systems, and processes. The project aims to ensure that the Council meets its settlement responsibilities and that it monitors and reports on these efforts.

4.52
The Department of Conservation has recognised that its "current system operates as a series of interdependent functions without any end-to-end oversight".

4.53
To improve this, it was conducting a review to understand the full resourcing implications of providing redress more effectively, identify and/or clarify which teams are accountable for providing redress, and embed processes to allocate appropriate resourcing (both financial and personnel) over time.

4.54
Centralised Māori outcomes or Māori engagement teams that support other teams to provide redress (mentioned in paragraph 4.10) can support the rest of the organisation to meet its commitments by acting as a broker between responsible teams and post-settlement governance entities and by helping the organisation understand its commitments.

4.55
We consider that these specialised teams are most effective when they have:

clarity of purpose;
clear roles and responsibilities that other relevant teams understand;
support from senior leadership; and
monitoring systems that enable regular progress reports from other responsible teams.

4.56
We found that these teams' usefulness was limited when these conditions were not present. In those instances, teams often got involved in other parts of the organisation's activities only if something went wrong or when they needed information to understand the status of settlement commitments.

4.57
Some public organisations over-relied on key individuals to provide settlement redress or maintain relationships with post-settlement governance entities.

Public organisations need to monitor their commitments

4.58
Public organisations need to monitor their settlement commitments. This is essential for them to identify and escalate risks and issues for resolution as early as possible. It is also important for them to be confident that they are managing or mitigating risks appropriately. Improved monitoring will also enable public organisations to understand and share good practices, and co-ordinate activities with other public organisations.

4.59
Most public organisations we spoke with had not routinely monitored the progress of their settlement commitments.

4.60
After December 2022, core Crown agencies were given six to 12 months to input their progress with their settlement commitments into Te Haeata. This included entering evidence that they had not met a commitment.

4.61
Te Arawhiti told us that, in assisting core Crown agencies to meet these deadlines, it found that some of these organisations had incomplete records of previous commitments. For example:

Some core Crown agencies (including Te Arawhiti itself) had no records of how and whether they had met some of their commitments.
Other core Crown agencies had lost information, such as when moving buildings or after earthquakes.

4.62
We also saw examples of some core Crown agencies becoming aware only in 2022/23 that they had not met some of their commitments.

4.63
In 2022, Te Arawhiti carried out a one-off stock-take of the status of the commitments in Te Kawerau ā Maki's settlement. Te Arawhiti identified that many of the letters of introduction that the settlement required public organisations and Ministers to send immediately – which encouraged organisations to enter relationship agreements with Te Kawerau Iwi Settlement Trust – had not been sent eight years after their settlement. This included one letter that Te Arawhiti was responsible for sending.

Some organisations have introduced or enhanced monitoring processes

4.64
Some core Crown agencies have started work on improving their systems for monitoring their commitments because they recognised that their existing systems were not fit for purpose. Others have introduced or were introducing systems because they previously did not have any.

4.65
This is positive. However, overall, most public organisations that we looked at still did not have adequate systems to keep track of their progress when we carried out our audit.

4.66
We identified several features of monitoring that public organisations were working on that we consider useful. These included:

a comprehensive list of all responsibilities, including those not currently listed in Te Haeata;
assigning clear internal accountability for responsibilities (for example, to particular managers); and
requiring responsible managers to regularly report on the status of commitments.

4.67
In our view, these are minimum requirements for effective monitoring processes. These features allow public organisations to provide regular and useful information about the status of their commitments. They also reinforce their internal accountability for settlement responsibilities, making sure responsible people and teams take ownership of legal and contractual requirements under settlements.

4.68
We also saw evidence that indicates that public organisations can implement systems of this kind using tools and resources already available to them.

Public organisations do not have enough information to understand risks or when to escalate

4.69
If public organisations do not have systems and processes to keep track of their responsibilities, they will not have enough information to identify risks to meeting their commitments or to fulfilling settlements' broader intent. Not clearly identifying risks means that public organisations will not be able to escalate them early enough to prevent settlement issues.

4.70
One example we saw of risks being tracked and escalated to relevant Ministers is Land Information New Zealand and Te Arawhiti's joint quarterly reporting to Ministers that began in 2021 (ending in 2023). Land Information New Zealand and Te Arawhiti jointly instigated this quarterly reporting after Land Information New Zealand had missed multiple statutory time frames for transferring Crown forestry licensed land title over several years.

4.71
The reporting focused on the outstanding title transfers, and provided status updates on Land Information New Zealand's broader settlement work programme. Land Information New Zealand told us that it still provides quarterly updates to its Minister on outstanding Crown forestry licenced land title transfers.

4.72
In our view, this kind of reporting is useful because it keeps Ministers informed of ongoing issues, the risks associated with them, and what the public organisation is doing to resolve them.

4.73
However, more broadly we saw little evidence of public organisations consistently informing their Ministers or governing bodies about how they were meeting their commitments and any associated risks.

4.74
Without comprehensive monitoring, public organisations do not understand their progress, which prevents useful reporting on these matters. In our view, this increases the likelihood that problems are escalated – either to Ministers and governing entities or to Te Puni Kōkiri – only after they have become significant settlement issues.

4.75
For the settlement system to function effectively and to support meaningful transparency and accountability, all public organisations need to comprehensively monitor their commitments.

4.76
In turn, this will support the system-level monitoring and reporting that is crucial to supporting assurance, transparency, and accountability for settlements. We discuss this further in paragraphs 6.71-6.87.

Public organisations are not consistently meeting their commitments

4.77
Although we saw evidence of public organisations meeting some commitments as intended, overall, public organisations are not consistently fulfilling their responsibilities in a timely way.

4.78
All of the settlements we looked at are about 10 years old, but public organisations have not provided some of those settlements' redress as intended. Examples include public organisations:

not sending letters of introduction on time or at all;
not starting or completing discussions about entering into relationship agreements;
not carrying out responsibilities in relationship agreements – for example, to hold and/or attend regular meetings; and
not meeting statutory time frames for transferring commercial redress, including significant commercial redress.

4.79
We know that public organisations have a range of other responsibilities and that meeting settlement commitments might make up only a small part of their wider work. However, settlement commitments are contractual and legal responsibilities. Any failure to meet them should be unacceptable.

4.80
In addition, fulfilling settlement commitments is significant and essential to post-settlement governance entities. Post-settlement governance entities are missing out on opportunities to benefit from the redress, and the renewed relationship that the settlement seeks to establish is undermined.

4.81
All of the post-settlement governance entities we spoke with are experiencing issues with significant relationship and commercial redress in their settlements. We received similar evidence about other settlements.

4.82
Staff of one post-settlement governance entity told us that they had experienced issues with every piece of major commercial redress promised in their settlement. More broadly, they said that their settlement makes it clear that public organisations should "know who we are" and foster a relationship based on "trust and respect". However, from their perspective, this was not happening. They said that they could not name a single agency that they have a good relationship with.

4.83
Staff of another post-settlement governance entity told us they had experienced "nothing but difficulties" and that, from their point of view, public organisations' handling of their settlement had been a "complete failure".

4.84
In another example, we were told about a public organisation that could not transfer a large number of deferred selection properties to a post-settlement governance entity within the standard statutory time frames (see paragraph 2.16). The post-settlement governance entity subsequently agreed a transfer schedule that the public organisation can manage. We were told that the public organisation had completed all but one of the transfers by December 2024. However, the post-settlement governance entity told us that higher interest rates when the transfers were completed meant that it would take up to an additional 10 years to pay off the loans it had secured to fund the purchases.

4.85
Issues with co-governance arrangements can also have significant impacts. For example, Te Urewera Act 2014 and Te Kawa o Te Urewera encapsulate Tūhoe's aspirations for Te Urewera.⁴⁶ Staff from the Department of Conservation told us the Department had historically focused on maintaining the natural features and biodiversity of Te Urewera as a place for public use and enjoyment. It had not given sufficient focus to supporting the connection between Tūhoe and Te Urewera, which is a core purpose of the relevant Act. This has affected the relationship between Te Uru Taumatua and the Department of Conservation.

4.86
Those staff from the Department of Conservation also acknowledged that they could do more to support Tūhoe's aspirations. The Department told us it has made recent changes to improve its efforts in this regard, which are still in their early stages.

4.87
We heard that the joint funding arrangement for Te Urewera has also been contentious. The Director-General of Conservation and the Chief Executive of Te Uru Taumatua must jointly agree the annual budget for managing Te Urewera, which each organisation must fund equally. However, Te Uru Taumatua considers that, since the Act was passed, the budgets agreed have not been sufficient to manage Te Urewera.

4.88
We did not audit this. However, the Department of Conservation acknowledged that the funding it ring-fences for Te Urewera (which has been around $2 million a year since 2022/23) is insufficient. It has worked to find additional funding where possible, but it has not been able to do this consistently. We saw documents that supported this.

4.89
We understand that the Department is still considering how to resolve this.

4.90
Overall, post-settlement governance entities we spoke with told us that they had spent considerable time and resources negotiating with public organisations about their provision of redress or seeking accountability for redress that public organisations had not provided as intended.

4.91
In our view, this does not align with the intent of settlements to renew relationships with the Crown.

Settlements need to be adequately prioritised

4.92
Staff at public organisations told us that when public organisations do not prioritise settlements they can struggle to meet their commitments in an effective or timely way. Te Arawhiti's staff told us that they had observed a "permissive environment" in some public organisations where officials felt that they could get away with not prioritising work on settlement commitments.

4.93
We note that only six core Crown agencies specifically mention settlement commitments in their strategic intentions documents.

4.94
For public organisations to consistently meet their settlement commitments, they must adequately prioritise and focus on them.

4.95
In our view, all public organisations with commitments should review their internal structures, resourcing, policies, systems, processes, and internal monitoring to meet them. At a minimum, these need to enable the organisation to:

understand the context each settlement was developed in, the central importance of the renewed relationship that each settlement establishes, and the significance of the commitments that the public organisation is responsible for;
understand whether it needs to adapt its business-as-usual processes, and understand the costs involved with providing settlement redress and supporting "partnership beyond specified redress";⁴⁷
clearly assign internal responsibility and accountability for meeting individual commitments (for example, to particular managers and/or teams);
have internal monitoring arrangements to enable it to understand and escalate risks and issues for resolution as early as possible and be confident that it is managing or mitigating risks appropriately; and
require responsible managers and/or teams to regularly update commitment status.

Recommendation 2
We recommend that all public organisations with settlement commitments review how they plan to meet and monitor their commitments.

4.96
We consider that the Public Service Commission could set clearer expectations for the chief executives of core Crown agencies, including through performance expectations and development plans, about the priority they should give to meeting their commitments. This includes the importance of both understanding and meeting individual commitments and establishing and developing the renewed relationships that settlements promise.

4.97
The Public Service Commission told us that, as of February 2025, two of the 41 chief executive's performance expectations contain specific references to settlements or settlement commitments. It said that it would consider whether and how it could "extend these references to strengthen expectations for other chief executives".

4.98
Responsible Ministers can, to varying degrees, influence the priority that Crown entities give to certain matters through the annual Statement of Expectations that Crown entities are required to prepare in accordance with the Crown Entities Act 2004.⁴⁸ In practice, Ministers sometimes do this by sending Ministerial Letters of Expectations to Crown entities' governance boards.

4.99
In our view, there are also opportunities for governors of Crown entities and local authorities to strengthen expectations on public organisations about prioritising the fulfilment of settlement commitments in performance agreements with chief executives.

Recommendation 3
We recommend that responsible Ministers, the Public Service Commission, and the governing bodies of Crown entities, local authorities, and other non-core Crown agencies with settlement commitments strengthen expectations on public organisations about meeting their commitments in performance agreements with chief executives and in other relevant mechanisms.

Public organisations should learn from one another

4.100
In Part 3, we highlighted the importance of public organisations working collectively to understand and give effect to settlements' "holistic intention". We also highlighted the importance of them co-ordinating effectively to maximise the opportunities to create enduring partnerships with post-settlement governance entities.

4.101
Public organisations told us that they see the value of co-ordinating their work and sharing best practice with other public organisations. We agree.

4.102
Public organisations told us that some specific settlement arrangements gave them opportunities to learn – for example, multi-agency relationship agreements, Accords, and regional forums.

4.103
These arrangements do not exist for all settlements. They also usually focus on a specific issue or sector, rather than fulfilling an entire settlement. However, we agree that other public organisations could learn from these.

4.104
We identified several characteristics of these arrangements that are likely to support public organisations to co-ordinate effectively. These are:

an effective lead agency to chair meetings, set priorities, and co-ordinate public organisations;
adequate secretariat support;
people with meaningful decision-making authority to carry out the agreed work;
maintaining what was described to us as "good governance hygiene" – in other words, parties meeting regularly, recording the discussion and action points, and reporting on progress with action points at subsequent meetings; and
public organisations holding each other to account for meeting obligations and milestones.

4.105
Public organisations and post-settlement governance entities told us of examples where multi-agency co-ordination became ineffective or stopped entirely because one or more of those characteristics was missing.

4.106
We saw some evidence of public organisations sharing practice. This included:

Bay of Plenty Regional Council sharing its experience of meeting commitments with another district council; and
Land Information New Zealand providing information to other public organisations to assist them to fulfil their commitments.

4.107
However, we did not see evidence that, overall, public organisations routinely share practice.

4.108
The public sector has significant collective experience and capability that organisations can learn from, which it has developed over 30 years of fulfilling settlements. We encourage the public sector to draw on this. Strengthened system leadership could assist organisations to leverage this experience to improve their overall performance.

43: Te Arawhiti defines statutory acknowledgements as an acknowledgement of "areas or sites with which iwi have a special relationship, and will be recognised in any relevant proceedings under the Resource Management Act. These provisions aim to avoid past problems where areas of significance to iwi and hapū, such as burial grounds, were cleared or excavated for public works or similar purposes without permission or consultation with iwi. Statutory Acknowledgements do not convey a property right and are non-exclusive." See Ngāti Toa Rangatira Deed of Settlement documents at whakatau.govt.nz.

44: New Zealand Productivity Commission (2019), Local government funding and financing: Final report, page 83, at treasury.govt.nz.

45: See Review into the Future for Local Government (2023), He piki tūranga, he piki kōtuku, page 76, at dia.govt.nz.

46: Te Kawa o Te Urewera is a publication from Te Urewera Board setting out Tūhoe's vision for the management of Te Urewera. See ngaituhoe.iwi.nz.

47: Te Arawhiti (2024), Guidance for Crown: Crown expectations for Crown Treaty settlement commitments, page 3, :at tpk.govt.nz.

48: See section 149H of the Crown Entities Act 2004, which provides for Ministers to participate in determining the contents of statements of performance expectations.