Part 2: Establishing new ways of working

Working in new ways to address family violence and sexual violence.

2.1
In this Part, we discuss:

2.2
The joint venture is an ambitious endeavour to establish an effective whole-of-government response to family violence and sexual violence. This involves transforming the way that government agencies work together.

2.3
These structural innovations are an important factor in achieving fundamental change. However, they are not enough by themselves. The Government has recognised that cultural and behavioural changes are also needed to support the development of new and innovative ways of working and thinking.

2.4
In our view, a critical part of developing new cultures and behaviours is ensuring that all the agencies involved in the joint venture have a clear and shared understanding of their respective roles, objectives, responsibilities, and accountabilities.

2.5
We expected to see those involved devoting time and effort to the question of what being part of a joint venture means for the agencies and for their respective roles in reducing family violence and sexual violence.

2.6
In particular, we expected that all involved – from the membership of the Board to the agency staff – would focus on:

  • how agencies need to work with each other, Māori, communities, and NGOs in the family violence and sexual violence sector (we discuss the joint venture's work with Māori and the sector in Part 3);
  • how the collective accountability introduced through the joint venture fits with the individual accountabilities and deliverables of the agencies – for instance, being clear on which areas need to be led by individual agencies, and which areas need collective leadership; and
  • the support that Ministers need to work in the new ways envisioned by the joint venture.

Summary of findings

2.7
The joint venture approach has resulted in more collaboration and co-ordination between the agencies. However, to achieve fundamental change the joint venture needs to move beyond co-operation between agencies and co-ordination of their individual activities and towards integration and cross-agency action.

2.8
Additionally, all involved in the joint venture need to have a shared understanding of what their respective roles and accountabilities will be and what this means in practice.

2.9
In our view, agencies do not yet have a common sense of ownership, responsibility, and accountability for the joint venture's work. The joint venture needs to devote time and effort to achieving the commitment and cohesive effort it needs from each of the agencies.

2.10
The Director and the business unit are important parts of the joint venture. They are critical to developing and supporting new ways of working between the agencies. A particular and ongoing issue is a lack of clarity about the role and authority of the Director and of the business unit. This needs to be clarified.

2.11
The joint venture has been driven by a highly ambitious set of deliverables. The pressure to deliver work has meant agencies have defaulted to working in ways that are familiar to them. It takes concerted time and effort to work differently.

2.12
In our view, the outcomes of reducing family violence and sexual violence are worth investing the time to allow agencies to develop the culture and types of behaviours that will support working in new ways.

Setting up the joint venture took time

2.13
The joint venture was publicly announced and began operating on 28 September 2018. It was led by an interim Director until a permanent Director took over in April 2019.

2.14
Many of those we spoke with noted the difficulty the joint venture faced during its first two years. They noted that setting up working relationships between the different parts of the joint venture was challenging because of regular changes of staff in the business unit.

2.15
Initially, the business unit was staffed by members of a multi-agency team that had helped develop the joint venture proposal and other staff on short-term contracts. Recruitment of permanent staff for the joint venture's business unit did not start until the second half of 2019 and was not completed until mid-2020.

2.16
Long-term funding for the joint venture was secured through Budget 2019. From 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019, the joint venture was funded by money remaining from Budget 2018 to develop the proposal for the joint venture. The Effective Justice Fund supplied further funding.

2.17
A cross-agency Deputy Chief Executive group was set up in early 2019. It took time for the Deputy Chief Executive group to develop its role. Many of the deputy chief executives we spoke with said that, at the beginning, it was not clear what was expected of them as a group or what their decision-making role would be.

2.18
The Deputy Chief Executive group has since become an important leadership group within the joint venture, supporting the Director by considering, prioritising, and advancing aspects of the joint venture's work. The Deputy Chief Executive group provides the joint venture with day-to-day support from senior executives at the agencies. The group is the main way the joint venture accesses support and resourcing from the agencies for its work.

2.19
During the joint venture's first year, agency staff and the joint venture's business unit worked to set up new working relationships and deliver an ambitious programme of work. This included working with the interim Te Rōpū (a group appointed by the Lead Minister in November 2018) on a national strategy and first action plan. We discuss this further in Part 3.

2.20
The joint venture's work included preparing:

  • a whole-of-government package for Budget 2019 to commit new funding to deliver on the strategy;
  • options for the ongoing form and funding of the enduring Te Rōpū Māori;
  • advice on appropriations that could be restructured to provide greater collective oversight and leadership, including possibly using multi-category appropriations; and
  • longer-term arrangements for engaging wider stakeholders.

The joint venture has been effective in some aspects of its work

2.21
Despite the challenges the joint venture faced during its first two years, it delivered some significant work in that time. For example, the joint venture produced whole-of-government packages for Budget 2019 and Budget 2020.

2.22
The whole-of-government budget packages involved officials from the agencies working together and using their knowledge and experience to prioritise multiple proposed initiatives.

2.23
Those involved in this process told us they developed a deeper understanding of the challenges that other agencies and NGOs in the family violence and sexual violence sector face. They were able to discuss what parts of the system needed the most support and, on that basis, what bids from agencies needed to be prioritised.

2.24
This cross-agency approach delivered budget packages that had support from across the agencies involved. These led to large investments in the family violence and sexual violence sector.

2.25
Many of the people we spoke with highlighted the budget processes as an example of the potential of the joint venture. We were told that the processes supported agencies to work together on developing specific bids. This was not happening before the joint venture. People also mentioned that joint ministerial oversight was a crucial factor that allowed initiatives to be effectively prioritised.

2.26
Similarly, the joint venture enabled closer co-ordination of agency-led family violence and sexual violence work as part of the Government's response to Covid-19. It was anticipated that the pandemic – and in particular, the nationwide lockdown – would increase pressure on vulnerable families and lead to an increase in violence.

2.27
The response to Covid-19 also placed pressure on all the agencies involved and necessarily diverted resources away from the joint venture's programme of work and to the emergency response. Agency staff, led by the business unit, acted to ensure that the Government's Covid-19 response included a focus on family violence and sexual violence prevention and response.

2.28
Many of those we spoke to agreed that the joint venture greatly assisted agencies to take a co-ordinated and timely response to Covid-19. Agency staff said that being part of the joint venture gave them greater awareness of what other agencies were doing and that this enabled their agency to better focus its efforts.

2.29
The response to Covid-19 also resulted in an improved cross-sector understanding of the prevalence of violence during the nationwide lockdown. Relevant joint venture agencies and some service providers from the family violence and sexual violence sector shared data to build a combined view of the rates of violence.

2.30
This work is ongoing. It has resulted in a data and insights initiative led by the business unit that is well supported by the agencies.

2.31
The budget processes and Covid-19 response work are examples of the value that greater co-operation and co-ordination of individual agency efforts can bring. However, to achieve fundamental change the joint venture needs to move beyond co-operation and co-ordination of agencies' individual activities and towards integration and collective action.

Work is needed to clarify the purpose of the joint venture and build collective ownership

2.32
An effective cross-agency approach needs all involved to devote time and effort to developing relationships. The agencies will also need to collectively consider what being a part of the joint venture means. It involves all parties building and refining a clear and shared understanding of their respective roles and accountabilities in delivering change and what this means in practice.

2.33
We found that the joint venture is not yet working in ways that create a shared understanding of roles and accountabilities. In our view, the Board needs to urgently prioritise this aspect of the joint venture.

Ministerial arrangements need support to be effective

2.34
Most of those we spoke with acknowledged that the joint venture's ministerial arrangements have not been fully effective. There was acknowledgment that staff involved with the joint venture – and, in particular, the Board – could have done more to familiarise Ministers with the joint venture's approach.

2.35
Effective ministerial oversight is an important factor in the joint venture being able to make a transformational change. The Social Wellbeing Committee was told that agencies working together in new ways would likely be disruptive and, at times, uncomfortable. It was expected that Ministers would play an important role in identifying and resolving points of tension that might arise between the agencies.

2.36
Ministers of the Social Wellbeing Committee are collectively accountable for the joint venture and its work. These Ministers are also individually responsible for their portfolios and agencies, including their agencies' contributions to the joint venture.

2.37
The joint venture introduced some new ministerial arrangements. A Lead Minister is responsible for the day-to-day oversight of the joint venture and its work. The joint venture reports to the Lead Minister.

2.38
The Director holds the day-to-day relationship with, and reports directly to, the Lead Minister on behalf of the Board. The Lead Minister also appointed members of the interim Te Rōpū in consultation with the Minister for Māori Development. (We discuss the interim Te Rōpū further in Part 3.)

2.39
The Lead Minister is supported by the Ministerial Group (see paragraph 1.28 and Figure 1). It was proposed that the Ministerial Group would help to resolve issues within the joint venture where possible. It would also support the development and co-ordinate advice to the Social Wellbeing Committee. Decisions about institutional arrangements and the governance needed for the joint venture were delegated to the Ministerial Group.

2.40
The joint venture is as new for the Ministers as it is for the agencies. The Ministers also need clarity on the joint venture approach, how it affects their portfolios, and what is expected of them, if they are to effectively support its development. This is particularly the case for the Lead Minister and the Ministerial Group.

2.41
We got a clear impression that, when the joint venture was set up, the Lead Minister and the Ministerial Group were not clear about their respective roles, how they would work together to consider the cross-agency advice put to them, and their respective roles in decision-making. This made it more difficult for the joint venture to make progress on parts of its programme of work.

2.42
The Board and the Director have worked to provide more support to Ministers since the end of 2019. This has included providing clarity on the respective roles of the Lead Minister and the Ministerial Group and more effective approaches to collective work on cross-agency advice.

2.43
There have been significant changes to ministerial arrangements following the 2020 general election. A new Lead Minister has been appointed and most of the Ministers involved are new to the joint venture. The Board and the Director will need to support Ministers to understand the importance of the approach if the joint venture's ministerial arrangements are to remain effective.

The roles of the Director and the business unit need to be clarified

2.44
In our view, the lack of understanding about the roles of the Director and the business unit has impeded the joint venture's work.

2.45
The Director acts on behalf of the Board to lead the whole-of-government response to family violence and sexual violence. The Director is supported in this role by the business unit, which assists the joint venture in delivering its programme of work.

2.46
The Director and the business unit are critical parts of the joint venture. They are independent of the agencies that make up the joint venture and are not involved with the many other issues that those agencies have to deal with. Their role is to maintain a focus on family violence and sexual violence, and encourage progress towards the types of changes needed to transform the whole-of-government response.

2.47
The Director and the business unit also support the development of the joint venture approach. They lead and support the joint venture's Board and the agencies in considering how they work together.

2.48
The ability of the Director to lead change to the whole-of-government response to family violence and sexual violence depends on all involved recognising that the Director has authority to lead. However, not everyone involved in the joint venture's work is clear about the role of the Director.

2.49
Those we spoke with recognised that the Director, supported by the business unit, provides a valuable co-ordinating function for the agencies' work. However, there was less clarity about the role of the Director in leading work and in making decisions about the joint venture's work. There is a similar lack of clarity about the role and authority of the business unit in decision-making.

2.50
It has led many to question decisions the Director and the business unit staff make. At times, this has resulted in extended debate about, and reworking of, collective work. This situation has slowed the joint venture in advancing some aspects of its programme of work.

The joint venture needs to focus on developing new ways of working

2.51
We consider that there is a significant risk that the joint venture could replicate the separate approaches that typified the way agencies worked together before the joint venture was set up.

2.52
We saw examples of the joint venture supporting agencies to have discussions and take action in a way that was not previously happening. For example, because of their involvement in the joint venture, some agencies have done new work together on preventing youth sexual violence.

2.53
We were told that this cross-agency work was not happening before the joint venture and probably would not have happened without it. Agencies were too busy with their own work programmes to make connections to the work of other agencies and combine their efforts.

2.54
However, the impression we received more broadly was that the joint venture has been working in "catch-up mode" since it was set up. This has meant that there is significant pressure on the business unit and agencies to deliver work quickly.

2.55
This pressure has defined how the agencies and the business unit have worked with each other. The focus has been on delivering separate pieces of work that need input from other joint venture agencies rather than on developing a new approach to cross-agency working.

2.56
For example, we saw an inconsistent approach from the business unit to keeping agency staff and sector stakeholders informed on how work was developing and how their contributions were incorporated into that work.

2.57
We were told that when this is done well, agency staff felt more positive about the work being produced and more certain of their role in developing that work. However, it has been challenging for the business unit to devote the resources needed to keep 10 agencies consistently up to date with all the work that is under way. (We discuss the resourcing of the joint venture further in Part 4.)

2.58
Separate work streams are at risk of becoming disconnected from each other and from the larger picture of what the joint venture is trying to achieve. How the different work streams have been prioritised and how they fit together needs to be clearer to all involved.

2.59
We raised these issues with the Director and senior staff of the business unit. They acknowledged that these are valid concerns. They also confirmed that they are aware of the problems and that they are committed to addressing them.

2.60
These are positive signs. The Director and the business unit are at the centre of the joint venture's approach, and they need to act if the joint venture is to work in ways that support implementing new and integrated cross-agency actions.

2.61
However, the Director and business unit cannot develop this new way of working by themselves. Some agency staff told us that agencies have been relying on the business unit to do the "heavy lifting" in the joint venture and were not actively considering what they have to do to make the joint venture a success.

2.62
All the agencies, supported and directed by the Board, need to commit to changing the ways they work together.

The joint venture needs to develop shared ownership, responsibility, and accountability

2.63
We found that the agencies had an inconsistent sense of ownership, responsibility, and accountability for the joint venture's work. Many reflected on their difficulty in balancing the joint venture's work with their agency's clearly defined responsibilities, objectives, and priorities.

2.64
Agencies need more clarity on how they should balance their individual accountabilities with the collective accountabilities introduced through the joint venture.

2.65
A crucial challenge is that there has not been a strategy or first action plan to help guide the work of the joint venture. A strategy would clearly set out what the joint venture is working towards and the most critical strategic objectives in achieving this.

2.66
This would help each agency to see the part that it plays alongside the other agencies in achieving the collective objectives. We understand that completing the national strategy is a priority for the joint venture. (We discuss the national strategy further in Part 3.)

2.67
However, more fundamentally, staff from the agencies were not all working in ways that reflect that they are part of the joint venture. In our view, some agency staff see the joint venture as something "other" to their work – that is, as a separate entity connected to aspects of their work but not something that they are a part of.

2.68
The agencies' varying senses of ownership of the joint venture also informs how they work with each other and with the business unit. Agency staff have tended to approach joint venture meetings as representatives of their respective agencies, rather than as members of a joint venture. Discussions can focus on the positions that agencies bring to meetings, rather than what they can do collectively to design a system that is focused on preventing violence.

2.69
People from NGOs in the family violence and sexual violence sector told us about a disconnection between the joint venture and the agencies who are part of it. They said that some agencies appeared to have little awareness of the joint venture's work. Agency staff who were not directly connected to that work have little appreciation of the joint venture's work and how it could affect their own work. (We discuss the joint venture's work with NGOs in the family violence and sexual violence sector in Part 3.)

2.70
We encourage the agencies to consider what actions they can take to communicate the work of the joint venture and clarify its role within each of the agencies.

The Board needs to act to support transformational change

2.71
It is clear to us that, in some aspects of the joint venture's work, there is a higher quality and level of collaboration and co-ordination than the agencies have previously experienced. In our view, the Board should take action now if the joint venture is to build on this progress.

2.72
The Board needs to ensure that all involved in the joint venture, including Ministers and staff within agencies, have a clear and shared understanding of their respective roles and accountabilities and what this means in practice.

2.73
There is a risk that the ongoing lack of clarity about the purpose of the joint venture and the roles of those involved will further delay the changes needed to support government agencies to work in new ways. As the Social Wellbeing Committee was advised, these new ways of working are necessary to support work that significantly and sustainably reduces family violence and sexual violence.

2.74
All those involved in the joint venture – from the Ministers to staff within individual agencies – need to understand their role and the roles of others in the joint venture. This includes how the accountabilities of individual agencies align to the collective accountability for the joint venture's work, how the agencies' priorities and work programmes align with those of the joint venture, and what agencies need to do within their organisations to prioritise collective work.

2.75
The Director needs the mandate and support from the Board to make decisions and direct the agencies' actions. This clarity is necessary for the Director to be able to effectively support and drive the joint venture's work towards changes that can deliver improved outcomes for those affected by family violence and sexual violence.

2.76
We understand that the joint venture has recently carried out work to address these concerns. We were told that a new way of working has been developed that aims to better connect the national level strategy and direction setting of the joint venture with the delivery of services at the regional level. It more clearly defines and communicates the role of the joint venture, the agencies involved in it, and the Director.

2.77
We encourage the joint venture to continue building on these positive steps.

Recommendation 1
We recommend that the Board of the joint venture continue work to ensure that all parties to the joint venture, from Ministers to staff in individual agencies, understand their roles and the roles of others in the joint venture.
Recommendation 2
We recommend that the Board of the joint venture continue work to clarify, affirm, and communicate the role, authority, and function of the Director and the joint venture's business unit.