Part 5: Managing risks

5.1
In this Part, we describe how well the three public entities are leading the strategic direction of SCIRT and how they identify and manage the high-level risks of the horizontal infrastructure rebuild.

5.2
We looked at the governance arrangements for SCIRT and how roles and responsibilities are defined. We also looked at how the three public entities carry out strategic planning and provide direction for SCIRT. We looked at whether the three public entities had determined what value would look like for the horizontal infrastructure rebuild, how they measure SCIRT's delivery of that value, how information is shared and communicated, and how decisions are made.

5.3
We expected that:

• the three public entities would have defined important roles and responsibilities, and that there would be a clear governance framework, appropriate delegations, and good communication;
• high-level strategic planning would be carried out to ensure that the horizontal infrastructure rebuild programme is linked with the wider Canterbury recovery and is repairing the right things, in the right place, at the right time, to the right standard;
• the three public entities would have agreed on the scope of works that SCIRT will deliver, have clearly expressed what value means in the context of the horizontal infrastructure rebuild, and are measuring SCIRT's achievement of that value within a cohesive performance framework; and
• information and reporting provided to the CGG and to the SCIRT Board would be enough, pitched at the right level, timely, and accurate, to ensure that progress towards objectives can be monitored, that risks can be managed, and that decision-makers are well informed.

Summary of this Part

5.4
We identified two main risks that could have a significant effect on the horizontal infrastructure rebuild if they remain unresolved. Several smaller issues pose more moderate risk.

5.5
The first main risk is the three public entities' strategic leadership of SCIRT. The effectiveness of the CGG is undermined by a lack of clarity about its role and the role of the independent chairperson. CERA has not fully engaged with the CGG or with SCIRT to the extent needed to effectively facilitate planning for the horizontal infrastructure rebuild. CCC and NZTA are engaged enough.

5.6
CERA, through the CGG, needs to facilitate better connections between SCIRT and other government agencies to better integrate the horizontal infrastructure with the rest of the Canterbury recovery. SCIRT's rapid pace of operation is misaligned with the slower progression of strategic planning. Protracted decision-making for the wider rebuild, especially for the central city rebuild, could reduce SCIRT's ability to deliver optimum value.

5.7
The second main risk is that the three public entities have not clearly defined the scope of the horizontal infrastructure rebuild. At the time of our audit, the three public entities had not been able to reach a common understanding of what levels of service and quality of infrastructure the rebuild will deliver. Construction work was under way, but there was not enough clear guidance for SCIRT to confidently deliver the right levels of service in the right places.

5.8
Several issues pose a more moderate risk to SCIRT's effective and efficient operation. The three public entities are still defining what value would look like for SCIRT. There is also no coherent framework for measuring SCIRT's performance and the overall achievement of programme objectives. SCIRT can draw on a large pool of data, but it could improve its use of that data to inform its Board and the three public entities on progress towards the rebuild's objectives. A proposed audit framework will also provide better assurance that SCIRT is well managed, once it is implemented.

Main risk 1: Strategic leadership of SCIRT

Roles, relationships, delegations, and communications

The effectiveness of the CGG is undermined by a lack of clarity about its role and the role of the independent chairperson. CERA has not fully engaged with the CGG or with SCIRT to the extent needed to effectively facilitate planning for the horizontal infrastructure rebuild.

5.9
The CGG was established to bring alignment between the three public entities and to bring a united owner-participant voice to the SCIRT Board. No business case was completed. Therefore, the outcomes sought at the strategic level were not formally or well defined at the beginning. This means that defining outcomes has been an iterative process. The CGG drafted its own terms of reference to provide direction to it and its subcommittees. The three public entities also told us that conversations about funding arrangements in the presence of non-owner participants were uncomfortable, especially while there were unresolved issues about funding between the three public entities.

5.10
The Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery appointed an independent chairperson, who has worked with the CGG for more than a year. However, the role has not been formally defined. This lack of clarity about the role of the independent chairperson does not help the CGG to understand its own role. Nor does it help the operational parts of the SCIRT structure to understand how to relate to the CGG.

5.11
The respective roles of the CGG and the SCIRT Board are sometimes blurred. For example, in the Board papers, there is an overlap in the matters that each body considers. It appears that client representatives have sometimes revisited matters at the CGG that they had already discussed with the SCIRT Board.

5.12
A new governance structure was proposed to address the lack of clarity of roles. The new structure was established in October 2013. New terms of reference will also be prepared. The proposed changes would rename the CGG to the Horizontal Infrastructure Governance Group (HIGG). The HIGG would focus on funding, scope and standards, strategy, and prioritisation. Reporting lines were still being confirmed at the time of our audit.

5.13
CERA staff told us that the governance changes would not alter the Alliance Agreement. The SCIRT Board would still exist, although its mandate would be much more focused on operational matters.

Recommendation 1 We recommend that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Christchurch City Council, and the New Zealand Transport Agency change the governance framework to address ambiguity about roles and responsibilities, including the role and responsibilities of the independent chairperson.

5.14
CCC and NZTA have provided consistent representation on the SCIRT Board and the CGG since SCIRT was established. Both NZTA and CCC changed their nominated representatives in late 2012. This meant that they would each have only one staff member fulfilling both the SCIRT Board and CGG appointments for their respective organisations. Previously, they had two. This was done to improve the passage of information and speed up processes. The established relationship between NZTA and CCC has helped them to share advice and work together.

5.15
Several different staff members have represented CERA on the CGG and the SCIRT Board in the past 18 months. Currently, CERA's official SCIRT governance representative has delegated their responsibility for attending meetings to a subordinate staff member. The delegate does not have a similar level of authority to the other client representatives on the CGG, and this has contributed to slower approval processes. Some of the subcommittees of the CGG also lack continuity because staff members at CERA have left.

5.16
This is a problem because part of CERA's purpose under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act is to facilitate, co-ordinate, and direct planning, rebuilding, and recovery of infrastructure. We note that CERA also faces some challenges, because a high proportion of staff are on secondments or short-term contracts.

5.17
CERA cannot effectively co-ordinate and direct the infrastructure rebuild if it does not get fully involved in the governance of SCIRT. CERA informed us that some portfolios were being reassigned internally, so that the appropriate person would have more time to attend meetings.

Recommendation 2 We recommend that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority contribute more consistently to effective leadership and strategic direction for the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team.

Integration of SCIRT with the Canterbury rebuild

SCIRT's work on the horizontal infrastructure needs to be better integrated with the rest of the Canterbury recovery, particularly through CERA facilitating better connections between SCIRT and other government agencies. SCIRT's rapid pace of operation is misaligned with the slower progression of strategic planning for the wider rebuild. Delays in decision-making for the wider rebuild, especially for the central city rebuild, could reduce SCIRT's ability to deliver optimum value.

5.18
SCIRT has a four-phase project prioritisation process (described in Part 4). The last phase requires SCIRT to engage with the three public entities and other organisations to understand external influences, such as their geographic, time, or schedule-related goals, that might affect prioritisation or support specific requirements of the wider recovery process. SCIRT's planning is ahead of the other agencies working on the rebuild.

5.19
Several examples show some of the complex planning that needs to be carried out and just how important it is for the horizontal rebuild to be integrated with other work. One example is planning for the future design of flood defences on the Avon River. Lateral spreading has affected the stopbanks on the Avon River, which is also bordered by red zone land. Lateral spreading is where the ground moves, opening up cracks. It is most severe near streams or waterways. It affects the stability of dwellings, buildings, and other structures. Figure 12 shows where SCIRT proposes to construct stormwater pipes through red zone land on either side of the Avon River.

Figure 12
Red zone land around the Avon River with stormwater reinstatement proposals

5.20
Any repairs or reconstruction work done on the flood defences will affect the overall capacity of the river network and will subsequently affect stormwater infrastructure needs.

5.21
SCIRT has informed the CGG that, because no decisions have been made about the future of red zone land and flood defence options, stormwater repair works will be delayed. CERA is responsible for resolving the future of red zone land. SCIRT has explained that delaying stormwater repair work would also delay critical roading repairs. It anticipates that these decisions could be delayed for 12 months or more.

5.22
Other examples of external factors that SCIRT must take into account include the Housing New Zealand intensification project, the Ministry of Education's school roll proposals, and Christchurch's An Accessible City draft transport plan.

5.23
Of all the external factors, the central city rebuild has the most effect on current operations. The availability of land for road corridors in the central city will become a problem once the vertical rebuild intensifies, because the various parties contributing to different aspects of the rebuild will want access to the same areas at the same time. How to manage competition for space is still being worked on. If this is not resolved soon, the vertical rebuild in the central city will be inefficient.

5.24
Co-ordination between SCIRT and CERA and between SCIRT and the Christchurch Central Development Unit has been problematic. SCIRT has lost important communication contacts in CERA because of CERA's staff turnover and restructuring. The disestablishment of CERA's infrastructure department as part of its restructure in November 2012 has made co-ordination more difficult for SCIRT.¹⁴

5.25
SCIRT and the horizontal infrastructure rebuild are part of the wider recovery programme for Canterbury and need to be integrated with other recovery plans prepared by CERA. For SCIRT to achieve the Alliance Agreement objective of doing "the right thing right, at the right time to the right standard every time", and "complete the rebuild effort to prescribed standards with minimal rework", it must be linked with, and fully informed about, the wider rebuild programme.

Recommendation 3 We recommend that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Christchurch City Council, and New Zealand Transport Authority use the governance arrangements to provide timely guidance to the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team on the priorities and direction of the rebuild.

Main risk 2: Defining the scope of the horizontal infrastructure rebuild

Funding and scope uncertainty

Estimating the scale of damage to repair has been difficult and is being revised over time. The three public entities have not reached a common understanding of the appropriate levels of service and the desired quality of infrastructure that the rebuild will deliver. As a result, construction work is under way, but there is not enough clear guidance for SCIRT to confidently deliver the right levels of service and quality needed in the right places.

5.26
It is reasonable to expect that, after a disaster, the extent of damage would be assessed over time, that the costs for the rebuild would be estimated, and that the estimate would become more accurate as more information is gathered. An initial estimate in 2011/12 for the cost of the horizontal infrastructure rebuild was reported as $2.015 billion (including SCIRT and non-SCIRT work). However, very little of the asset assessment had been completed at that stage, so less information was available to assess the extent of damage.

5.27
The estimate for SCIRT work only was redeveloped using more accurate information and approved in 2013. The updated SCIRT estimate of "most likely cost" is $2.496 billion (about the mid-point of a "best cost" estimate of $2.283 billion and a "worst cost" estimate of $3.189 billion, which includes targeting potential savings of $300 million). An independent assessor will review this estimate again and report on the finalised rebuild work and costs by December 2014.

5.28
The funding arrangements require CCC and the Crown to agree on the proportion of the costs that they will each fund. CCC represents the interests and expectations of the residents of Christchurch. The Crown must consider the financial effect on, and fairness to, New Zealand taxpayers generally. These are difficult trade-offs, which require support from all levels of government.

5.29
In June 2013, the three public entities formalised their cost-sharing arrangements for the horizontal infrastructure rebuild, as well as costs for residential red zone land, residential red zone land subject to rock fall and rock roll, and the anchor projects.¹⁵ The Crown has agreed to contribute a maximum amount of $1.8 billion towards the rebuild of horizontal infrastructure (SCIRT and non-SCIRT work). This includes CERA funding 60% of costs for the water infrastructure and NZTA funding 83% of the roading infrastructure. CCC will fund a total of $1.14 billion. The report produced by the independent assessor will provide the basis for any further discussion on cost sharing, and the contribution from each could go up or down.

5.30
The need for the three public entities to formalise cost-sharing arrangements has led to a more rigid budget than the estimate SCIRT was previously working to. To adjust to this arrangement, SCIRT has rescoped some of its work with the Scope and Standards Committee to identify opportunities for savings. This approach will place a focus on remaining asset life, ongoing operational costs, and overall network levels of service when considering what interventions are required for the rebuild. SCIRT has recommended to the CGG to apportion the funding available on an area basis and allocate finance to projects in the best way it can to achieve the level of service required with the money available.

5.31
The Alliance Agreement outlines the scope of SCIRT works. It defines the desired level of repair for horizontal infrastructure as "a standard and level of service comparable with that which existed immediately prior to the September 2010 earthquake". At the time of our audit, the three public entities had not reached a common understanding of what this means. Although construction work was under way, there was not enough clear guidance for SCIRT to confidently deliver the right levels of service in the right places.

Design standards and guidelines have been revised over time

The Infrastructure Recovery Technical Standards and Guidelines have an immediate and long-term effect on cost and quality. At the time of our audit, the three public entities had not provided guidance with the detail necessary for SCIRT to make decisions about trade-offs and to deliver optimal solutions.

5.32
Design is guided by several standards and guidelines. The most significant of these are the Infrastructure Recovery Technical Standards and Guidelines (IRTSG). The IRTSG were produced by CCC, CERA, and NZTA to identify the scope, objectives, intervention levels, and defined standards for the response to the Christchurch earthquakes.¹⁶

5.33
The Scope and Standards Committee is responsible for ensuring that the IRTSG are applied consistently. It considers scope, betterment, and proposals to depart from the standards for individual projects. The representatives on the Scope and Standards Committee are not an even representation from the three public entities. Most are CCC representatives.¹⁷

5.34
SCIRT told us that it is sometimes hard to get agreement on the right balance between building resilience into the system and betterment. How to backfill trenches is an example of an issue where SCIRT and CCC staff have differing views on the most appropriate solution. A working group has been set up to consider and test alternative solutions.

5.35
The scale of work being carried out in Christchurch is significant, so the design solutions adopted must be carefully considered. They will have an extensive effect on the cost and quality of the infrastructure network. It is necessary for decision-making and planning that the three public entities funding the rebuild are involved in setting standards.

5.36
The IRTSG were produced specifically for SCIRT and the post-earthquake horizontal infrastructure rebuild. They are intended to inform and guide the technical assessment of damage, the design and construction of the repair and renewal of Council-owned infrastructure, and the handover process back to CCC. They also provide definitions for infrastructure resilience and betterment for the purposes of the rebuild.

5.37
The IRTSG defines the primary and secondary objectives for the infrastructure recovery:

• Primary: "To return the infrastructure network to a condition that meets the levels of service prior to the September 2010 earthquake within the timing constraints of the rebuild."
• Secondary: "Where restoration work is undertaken, and where reasonably possible and economically viable, greater resilience is to be incorporated into the network."

5.38
The CGG's Scope and Standards Committee maintains and amends the IRTSG. The Committee forwards its recommended changes to the CGG for approval.

5.39
The IRTSG were also independently reviewed on behalf of the CGG in December 2011. The reviewers were asked to consider whether the IRTSG provided enough information about intervention strategies. The reviewers were also asked to consider whether the IRTSG provided adequate guidance to enable the achievement of the potentially competing objectives of reinstating the infrastructure to pre-2010 earthquake levels and ensuring that there is enough rigour in determining intervention strategies to avoid "over-renewing" the assets.¹⁸ We interpret over-renewing to mean repairing or replacing assets to a level of service or quality that is better than that considered necessary.

5.40
The reviewers found that the IRTSG needed to be clearer. Of particular significance, the review found that the IRTSG allowed for significant latitude and variable standards to be applied. It also recommended clarifying how the term "resilience" should be applied in a technical sense.

5.41
It was difficult for the reviewers to draw specific conclusions on cost implications. However, the reviewers noted that, because of the flat nature of Christchurch, it is not always possible or practical to comply with standard gradients and that steeper gradients would mean additional costs for pumping stations and flushing chambers.

5.42
As a result of the review, the CGG compiled a timetable of action and responses. The IRTSG were revised, and SCIRT reported that it was a much easier document to use and to apply. However, the IRTSG still did not adequately define levels of service for assets. At the time of our audit, SCIRT reported that it was difficult to know what levels of service existed in September 2010 and to work out how to achieve that.

5.43
The earlier versions of the IRTSG essentially required SCIRT to fix broken assets, based on the assumption that a repair or replacement would return the asset to the former level of service provided. This worked well for the worst damaged areas and emergency works, because these were largely all replacements.

5.44
Now that the rebuild is getting into less damaged areas, a more considered assessment is needed because it is possible to use remaining asset life. Trade-offs can be made about repairing or replacing an asset now or doing it later if, for example, the pipe or road is still doing what it is supposed to do. Network performance, ongoing maintenance costs, and estimated remaining asset life are also considered.

5.45
We were told that the Scope and Standards Committee has amended the IRTSG to include a table of levels of service for each asset type, to better address the shift from fixing damage to restoring levels of service. We have not had an opportunity to review the recent changes, so cannot comment on their effectiveness. However, it is essential that the amended version delivers the guidance needed.

Recommendation 4 We recommend that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Christchurch City Council, and the New Zealand Transport Agency agree on the levels of service and quality of infrastructure that the rebuild will deliver, in conjunction with confirming funding arrangements, and consider a second independent review of the Infrastructure Recovery Technical Standards and Guidelines.

Other issues posing more moderate risks

Defining value

Work is in progress to outline the value proposition in a coherent way, which will help with refining the performance framework.

5.46
When approving the signing of the Alliance Agreement, the responsible Ministers noted that CERA and the Treasury were continuing to work with SCIRT on defining value for money.

5.47
A series of documents set out the reasons for establishing SCIRT and its intended purpose. The original proposals to the Government and CCC described the benefits of alliance contracting. For example, the CCC proposal said that choosing an alliance would reduce overheads, streamline approvals, and increase the participation of the private sector. An alliance would be the most agile method of dealing with the evolving scope of the works. It was expected that SCIRT would support CCC's strategic objectives and achieve value for money.

5.48
More specific benefits about SCIRT can be found in the Alliance Agreement under several different clauses, beginning with an overall commitment to work together in good faith, with trust, mutual respect, and a "no blame" culture. The three public entities started, but did not complete, a business case to link the Alliance Agreement to the original proposal for an alliance.

5.49
The Alliance Agreement contains 12 objectives. These cover a range of matters, including safety, communication and community engagement, minimising rework, environmental standards, building resilience, co-ordinating with others, innovation, lifting the capability of the work force, and maintaining a sustainable market condition.

5.50
Over time, SCIRT has been preparing a document to describe SCIRT's value. The CGG reviewed this document in March 2013. It is an attempt to describe SCIRT's historical context, including its formation and intended benefits, and present the results achieved to the end of January 2013. Its structure is guided by the Australian Government National Alliance Contracting Guidelines (Guidance Note 4). The document lists several advantages that SCIRT considered an alliance model would deliver to the Christchurch rebuild. These included the ability to adapt to an evolving scope and the need to build more resilient assets.

5.51
The original proposal for SCIRT focused on the generic benefits of the alliance model. Beyond this and the Alliance Agreement objectives, work on defining SCIRT's specific value in a concise way is incomplete. Resolving this issue will also help the three public entities to define a performance measurement framework.

Providing assurance about SCIRT's performance

There is no complete framework for measuring SCIRT's performance. At the time of our audit, the three public entities were working closely with SCIRT on a form of earned-value reporting, intended to provide a more strategic view of progress.

5.52
SCIRT and the three public entities have been developing ways to measure performance. Although the Alliance Agreement contains 12 objectives, it is not clear how all the objectives are measured at a programme level or to what extent they are being achieved. Some of the objectives are relatively general, while others outline quite specific tasks and timeframes. Many of the objectives are covered by the KRAs, but the KRAs primarily measure the performance of delivery teams and projects. However, when those results are aggregated, they reflect SCIRT's performance as an organisation for those nominated areas.

5.53
When approving the signing of the Alliance Agreement, the responsible Ministers also noted that CERA would independently audit the quality of the works carried out and monitor the actual costs of the work programme against budgeted costs. CERA would also carry out an independent review of SCIRT to assess its performance in planning and managing the delivery of horizontal infrastructure. Although a proposal was prepared to evaluate SCIRT's operations, the evaluation did not proceed.

5.54
Some aspects of the review were overtaken by work that the CGG commissioned through an external consultancy. The CGG wanted to gain an independent view on the adequacy of its performance metrics.

5.55
The CGG received the report from the external consultancy in March 2013. The report gave a high-level review and was followed by a proposal to carry out further work on the metrics. The CGG asked SCIRT to progress its earned-value work and asked the external consultancy to prepare a proposal for additional work. At the time of our audit, the three public entities were working closely with SCIRT on a form of earned-value reporting that will provide a more strategic view of progress.

Recommendation 5 We recommend that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Christchurch City Council, and the New Zealand Transport Agency use a coherent framework for measuring key aspects of the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team's performance that integrates project-level delivery team performance with alliance objectives and overall programme delivery, and is based on sound measures tested through the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team's internal auditing regime.

The client's audit framework

NZTA's reviews of SCIRT's systems and processes have been positive. A proposed audit framework, which started in October 2013, will provide better assurance.

5.56
In October 2012, NZTA reviewed SCIRT's estimation systems and processes to provide assurance that these were consistent with NZTA's processes. Overall, the NZTA engineering advisor was comfortable that robust processes were being applied and that SCIRT had a mature approach to risk and opportunity management. The advisor suggested that there were opportunities to increase efficiencies by increasing the size of packages (project size) and suggested that temporary traffic management standards were too high (which increases cost).

5.57
As part of an investment audit of CCC in April 2013, NZTA reviewed claims for earthquake-recovery work. NZTA's audit concluded that there were very good processes and controls to ensure that projects followed the authorised delivery process, that there were excellent checks on how target costs were calculated, and that, although quality assurance processes appeared to be lean to start with, they had improved as SCIRT systems matured.

5.58
NZTA recommended that thought be given to the completion of the rebuild programme – in particular, the calculation and payment of pain/gain, the management of defects liability, and the final realisation of SCIRT's assets. This was an audit activity carried out under a wider audit framework that the three public entities were preparing at the time.

5.59
The three public entities have worked with SCIRT to produce an audit framework to provide assurance to the funding partners and other interested parties that SCIRT is well managed and delivering value for money. NZTA has led the planning for the work, with contributions from CCC and SCIRT. NZTA has waited more than a year for feedback from CERA, which recently included fraud detection as a heading in the framework.

5.60
The proposed audit framework has good coverage of important SCIRT systems and processes. There is an appropriate mixture of one-off reviews, ongoing monitoring, and spot checking. Resources to carry out the work have recently been identified. NZTA and a commercial firm acting on behalf of the three entities started audit work on 14 October 2013 under three areas of the framework. The continued implementation of the audit framework will provide a much needed layer of assurance.

Recommendation 6 We recommend that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Christchurch City Council, and the New Zealand Transport Agency ensure that their framework for auditing the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team provides them with adequate assurance that the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team is well managed and delivering value for money.

Information, reporting, and decision-making

SCIRT has lots of data and the capacity to produce customised reports. However, the three public entities have not confirmed what information is needed to gain assurance that SCIRT is meeting its rebuild objectives. As a result, operational information provided in Board papers covers many topics but lacks focus in its analysis.

5.61
SCIRT has information available for most aspects of performance. The SCIRT Board receives a quarterly one-page report covering several areas, with high-level measures.¹⁹ It also receives a monthly operational report from the General Manager of SCIRT with much more detail (for example, activities carried out, types of safety events, main issues, and forthcoming priorities).

5.62
Updates on other aspects of the rebuild are provided as required, through separate reports from the responsible manager. A separate set of papers compiled for the CGG provide well-presented information to address appropriate issues. The CGG also reviews the minutes of SCIRT Board meetings to note any client-specific action points.

5.63
In the SCIRT Board papers, the analysis presented for the operational report is highly detailed and not conducive to understanding how well SCIRT is performing overall. There are a range of reports on different aspects of performance, but it is not easy to form a coherent view because different measures are used for various aspects of SCIRT's operation.

5.64
SCIRT reports a summary of high, very high, or extreme programme risks. In the papers we reviewed, it was not clear how the risks were trending or how effective mitigating actions were. The quarterly report provides a useful snapshot of performance in a one-page format, with traffic light indicators of achievement. The SCIRT Board and the CGG should provide more clarity about what information is important for their review and what further analysis is needed to demonstrate value for money.

5.65
The volume of paper that goes to the CGG is substantial. There is a high level of detail, which sometimes reaches into operational matters. This reflects ambiguity about the respective roles of the SCIRT Board and the CGG and can lead to matters being passed between them. We discussed this ambiguity about roles in paragraphs 5.9-5.13.

5.66
Both bodies could benefit from more strategic analysis and better reporting of high-level risk. The CGG has identified that earned-value reporting is still needed to track performance against planned cost and schedule at a programme level, as we discussed in paragraph 5.55.

Recommendation 7 We recommend that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Christchurch City Council, and the New Zealand Transport Agency, in conjunction with strengthening performance measures, provide feedback to the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team to improve the analysis and information included in reports to the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team Board and make these reports more useful.

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14: Management positions in the infrastructure unit were disestablished, and reporting lines for staff were realigned to the Christchurch Central Development Unit.

15: Anchor projects are the major projects (defined in the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan) that will form the foundations of the central city rebuild and are intended to stimulate further development and recovery of central Christchurch.

16: Two other standards set out the design or enhancement of infrastructural assets in Christchurch and the technical requirements for the construction of land and asset developments that are carried out on behalf of CCC or that are intended to be taken over or maintained by CCC.

17: The committee is chaired by CCC and attended by six CCC representatives, one NZTA representative, and one CERA representative.

18: The reviewers were also asked to specify where CCC standards differed from New Zealand industry standards, why they differed, and the cost implications of the differences.

19: Performance against KRAs forms part of this.

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