Part 3: Working relationships, governance, and sharing information

Effectiveness of arrangements for co-ordinating civilian maritime patrols.

3.1
In this Part, we discuss:

how everyone worked together (both operationally and strategically);
the strategic and operational guidance for the NMCC;
patrol co-ordination arrangements; and
sharing information about the maritime domain.

Summary of our findings

3.2
The NMCC's established governance arrangements, communication, and working relationships provided an appropriate framework to support effective maritime patrol co-ordination. Several documents set out the roles and responsibilities of the various organisations involved in maritime patrols and provided guidance on how organisations should work together. The NMCC had several systems that enabled communication and consultation with different groups in its governance structure. The core agencies and NZDF generally understood the governance arrangements, and worked together to find solutions to operational problems. The core agencies and NZDF were positive about the improvements in maritime patrol co-ordination since the NMCC was established.

3.3
Although an appropriate framework was in place, some improvements and more clarity were needed to support more effective co-ordination. Getting everyone working together strategically was difficult because of their differing priorities. This lack of strategic involvement was a potential barrier to further progress and to achieving effective co-ordination.

3.4
There was little strategic and operational guidance in place to support and guide the NMCC in its patrol co-ordination activities and to underpin its governance arrangements. The NMCC was working to put this guidance in place. We consider this guidance critical for supporting the NMCC and its patrol co-ordination activities, for ensuring that these activities are targeted to best effect, and for supporting cross-agency discussion about the effectiveness of patrols.

3.5
There are some patrol arrangements that are not co-ordinated by the NMCC. These separate co-ordination arrangements do not align well with the whole-of-government approach the NMCC was set up to achieve. There is a risk that these separate co-ordination arrangements could result in less effective patrol co-ordination and use of patrol resources. As NZDF's new and upgraded ships and aircraft increase the maritime patrol capability, it will be important to ensure that these ships and aircraft are used effectively to meet all of the country's maritime patrol interests and that separate patrol co-ordination arrangements do not impede this.

3.6
We make four recommendations in this Part about reviewing strategic leadership arrangements, establishing better guidance on an appropriate level of patrolling, clarifying patrol co-ordination arrangements, and monitoring any separate patrol co-ordination arrangements.

3.7
Some work was already under way to address matters that we considered important. Because the work was already under way, we have not made specific recommendations but will maintain an interest in the work's progress. The pieces of work included:

consolidating governance documentation, including the NMCC Working Group's terms of reference;
finalising strategic and operational guidance; and
establishing information requirements and improving information systems to support more effective information sharing.

How organisations worked together on operational issues

The NMCC, NZDF, and the core agencies worked together to find solutions to operational problems. The organisations generally understood the governance arrangements and their respective roles and responsibilities.

3.8
Guidance on governance arrangements, roles, and responsibilities was set out in several documents. This guidance was comprehensive and included advice on where the NMCC, NZDF, government agencies, and other interested organisations could expect to contribute to direction setting, planning, and aircraft or ship allocation. Information sharing and communication protocols were also provided for. The guidance provided an appropriate framework to work within, and it allowed some flexibility to accommodate different organisations' needs.

3.9
The core agencies were positive about the improvements that had occurred in maritime patrol co-ordination since the establishment of the NMCC. They told us they were comfortable with their access to NZDF's aircraft or ships within the resources available and how the NMCC prioritised their needs. When conflicting needs arose, the core agencies told us that they were usually able to resolve these themselves. The core agencies considered that they had a good understanding of each others' needs. In our interviews, several people recalled only one situation where the NMCC had to decide which agency should get access to a patrol aircraft or ship. The agencies involved accepted the decision and considered that this showed that systems were working as they were supposed to.

3.10
Generally, the NMCC, NZDF, and the core agencies had a clear sense of the NMCC's operational independence, and an understanding of where roles and responsibilities stopped and started and of procedures to be followed. Where people tried to operate outside established procedures, it was a matter of educating or reminding them of the procedure to be followed. This was done through NMCC Working Group meetings, co-ordination meetings (see paragraph 4.18), and informal discussions and feedback.

3.11
When the NMCC's governance arrangements were established, some of the organisations involved or interested in maritime patrols noted a potential risk that the NMCC's operational independence could be compromised by its co-location at NZDF's Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand, or its hosting arrangement with the New Zealand Customs Service. We did not find any evidence to suggest that these arrangements had affected the NMCC's operational independence.

3.12
Staff from the NMCC, NZDF, and the core agencies were positive about the co-location of the NMCC at Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand. This arrangement provided access to secure information systems and to NZDF's planners and decision-makers. Not only was this access useful when it came to operations, but it was important for building relationships and understanding each others' work.

How organisations worked together on strategic issues

The NMCC found it difficult to get everyone working together strategically because of the differing priorities among the various government agencies, and between the agencies and the NMCC. This lack of strategic involvement was a potential barrier to making further progress and achieving effective co-ordination.

3.13
The NMCC's ability to function well as a whole-of-government arrangement relied heavily on relationship management, communication, and the active participation of everyone involved. The NMCC had several systems enabling communication and consultation with different governance groups. The NMCC consulted the NMCC Reference Group, the NMCC Working Group, and also consulted through its occasional reporting to ODESC. The NMCC planned to improve the governance of the NMCC Working Group through terms of reference covering its role, purpose, membership, and frequency of meetings. We consider that terms of reference would be useful guidance.

3.14
We saw that the NMCC was actively seeking to engage more widely with everyone involved. The NMCC acknowledged that one of its major challenges was in getting everyone involved to engage at more strategic levels.

3.15
The NMCC's governance arrangements allowed for leadership from the host agency and strategic involvement through the NMCC Reference Group. As a service provider, the NMCC needed government agencies to get involved and to specify their needs so that the NMCC could tailor its services to meet those needs. Achieving this, in practice, was difficult because the NMCC must strive for a balance between encouraging agency involvement, reconciling different agencies' interests, maintaining operational independence, and being seen to operate in a transparent way.

3.16
Achieving effective co-ordination was challenging because the NMCC had to work with the differing priorities of government agencies. Maritime patrol co-ordination was the bulk of the NMCC's work and it aimed to take a whole-of-government perspective. In contrast, maritime patrols were a smaller activity for the agencies. For the agencies, maritime patrols helped them to achieve some of the many goals and outcomes they were expected to deliver. At times, these differing priorities made it difficult to for the NMCC to work with the agencies and get their support for initiatives that had a whole-of-government focus.

3.17
The NMCC Reference Group had an important function in the NMCC governance structure because it was supposed to operate as a mechanism for generating strategic involvement in the NMCC. However, during our interviews, people questioned the NMCC Reference Group's effectiveness in getting everyone involved to engage at a strategic level. They considered there was overlap with the NMCC Working Group and questioned whether the NMCC Reference Group was attended by the most appropriate organisational representatives. The NMCC Reference Group met annually and meetings were supposed to be attended by the chief executives of the core agencies, the DPMC, and the Chief of Defence Force. In practice, NMCC Reference Group members often delegated their attendance to less senior staff.

3.18
The progress made in establishing the NMCC as a whole-of-government arrangement should not be underestimated. However, the lack of involvement at more strategic levels was a potential barrier to further progress and to achieving effective maritime patrol co-ordination. Research identifies that important dimensions of successful whole-of-government co-ordination are leaders committed to making it work, and buy-in to the co-ordinated approach from all parties.¹⁰

3.19
We consider that there would be value in examining whether the NMCC Reference Group, in its current form, is best placed to provide the necessary strategic leadership and to support the effective co-ordination of maritime patrols and use of patrol resources. Defining who should attend meetings and how often the NMCC Reference Group should meet may be useful in improving the structure of the NMCC Reference Group and its effectiveness. Terms of reference, similar to those planned for the NMCC Working Group, could also be useful.

Recommendation 1
We recommend that the National Maritime Co-ordination Centre and all organisations involved or interested in maritime patrols review the governance of the National Maritime Co-ordination Centre's Reference Group to ensure that it is effective in meeting strategic leadership needs and that the benefits from this whole-of-government arrangement are maximised.

Strategic and operational guidance for the National Maritime Co-ordination Centre

Strategic and operational guidance supporting the NMCC's purpose and functions was minimal. The NMCC was working to put this guidance in place.

3.20
Although there was a framework for NMCC governance, there was little strategic and operational guidance underpinning this and supporting the NMCC and its patrol co-ordination activities. This gap existed despite there being clear direction in the NMCC's Governance Framework on the form and content that strategic and operational guidance should take. Figure 4 shows the relationship between strategic and operational guidance for maritime patrols.

A maritime patrol strategy

3.21
The NMCC's Governance Framework identified that a maritime patrol strategy was an important part of the NMCC's governance. The strategy was to support the NMCC in maintaining a whole-of-government perspective for maritime patrols and the maritime domain. It would provide direction to the NMCC and everyone involved by identifying:

specific government goals and objectives;
specific environmental and operational issues affecting high-level maritime patrol interests;
major areas of focus;
responsibilities for reporting; and
how the strategy is reviewed.

Figure 4
Framework for the strategic and operational guidance of maritime patrols

Adapted from the NMCC's Governance Framework.

3.22
At the time of our audit, the New Zealand Customs Service (in its host agency role), the NMCC, government agencies, and other interested organisations had been working on a maritime patrol strategy for about 18 months. Reconciling the range of views about what the strategy should be, along with the requirement that organisations and Ministers agree on the strategy's content, meant it was not easy to co-ordinate. Consequently, progress with the strategy was slow. Some organisations considered that the strategy was intended to be focused on the NMCC and others thought it should be whole-of-government focused. During our interviews, several people commented that government direction on the strategy would be helpful.

3.23
We consider that having a longer-term view of what maritime patrols are trying to achieve, and the risks or barriers to achieving those objectives, is critical. Clear and well-stated strategic objectives provide direction for more current work and ensure that this work is targeted to best effect. There is scope to improve how everyone involved works together. A strategy will support the NMCC's mandate and all organisations will be able to see how current projects relate to the longer-term view and what the NMCC and the Government are trying to achieve.

3.24
We were concerned by how long it has taken to write and agree on a strategy. It is an important document for ensuring that maritime patrols are co-ordinated effectively, making the best possible use of the country's limited patrol resources, and fully supporting broader maritime interests. We consider that progressing work on the strategy is a matter of priority.

Subsequent progress on the maritime patrol strategy

3.25
After our audit fieldwork, the NMCC submitted a draft strategy to the NMCC Reference Group for its consideration. After final comments were incorporated, the draft strategy was to be resubmitted at a NMCC Reference Group meeting in March 2010.

3.26
We note two proposed actions from the draft strategy. These are:

reviewing current maritime information to identify knowledge gaps and test assumptions; and
monitoring existing patrol and surveillance requirements, and identifying requirements for future capability.

3.27
In our view, these activities are a critically important part of ensuring the effectiveness of maritime patrols, and we encourage the NMCC and all organisations involved or interested in maritime patrols to ensure that these actions are carried out.

Annual planning and operational guidance

3.28
The NMCC's Governance Framework identified the preparation of an annual plan as a crucial planning process for supporting the NMCC in maintaining a whole-of-government perspective. The annual plan was to provide an integrated picture of maritime patrol needs and commitments from the NMCC and government agencies. The NMCC's Governance Framework specified that the annual plan should include:

annual objectives and tasks from the maritime patrol strategy;
risks that might arise within the planning time frame;
annual patrol requirements;
planned NMCC and aircraft/ship provider outputs;
a schedule of planned meetings; and
reporting requirements.

3.29
Some operational guidance did already exist (for example, the NMCC business plan and the risk-based surveillance plans of the core agencies). However, there was no single document that addressed the requirements set out in the Governance Framework.

3.30
We consider that there is value in having an overview of the likely annual needs and contributions of the NMCC, the core agencies, and NZDF, possible risks, and the objectives to be achieved. This information can be useful when planning for patrol aircraft and ship use, and can provide direction for patrolling activities (we describe the need for this further in Part 4). The Governance Framework noted that this information provided a way to consider service levels and outputs at the end of the planning period, to generate discussion about these results, and to contribute to the next year's patrol planning. We consider that this review and discussion would be useful.

3.31
With the introduction of the new planning process (described in Part 2), the NMCC was writing documentation to support its day-to-day activities. We consider that having this documentation in place is important for managing business continuity risks and ensuring that institutional knowledge is retained.

Planning and the frequency of patrols

3.32
The Maritime Patrol Review concluded that more frequent patrols were needed to provide effective surveillance and deterrence. Delays in acquiring and upgrading patrol aircraft and ships limited NZDF's ability to increase the frequency of patrolling. However, even with the additional patrol capability that these aircraft and ships are intended to provide, NZDF's planned allocations fall short of estimated civilian patrol requirements. Figure 5 compares the estimated annual civilian patrol requirements with what NZDF has allocated. Paragraphs 3.33-3.35 discuss the information summarised in Figure 5.

3.33
In 2001, the Maritime Patrol Review estimated a need for 2000 to 3000 flying hours just for civilian patrol purposes. At the time of our audit, the RNZAF had allocated 2500 flying hours annually to fulfil a range of military and civilian patrol tasks. From this total, 720 flying hours were made available for civilian patrols (400 for patrols in New Zealand's EEZ and 320 hours for patrols of Pacific nations' EEZs).

Figure 5
Estimated annual civilian patrol requirements compared with the New Zealand Defence Force's planned allocations

	Aerial patrol time (hours)	Surface patrol time (sea days)
Estimated civilian patrol requirements	2000-3000*	1371**
Planned NZDF patrol outputs (civilian and military needs, including core training and military combat readiness)	2500 The 2500 hours includes: 400 hours planned for government agencies' civilian patrols; and 320 hours planned for Pacific patrols.	To be delivered by four inshore patrol ships: 438-518 To be delivered by two offshore patrol ships: 93-113

* From the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review.

** From the 2002 Maritime Forces Review.

3.34
Surface patrol requirements were defined by the 2002 Maritime Forces Review. The Royal New Zealand Navy (the Navy) carried out this work to identify the optimum mix of naval capability. Part of the work involved identifying the number of sea days required to meet the civilian patrol requirements. Consultation with government agencies¹¹ established that about 1371 days were needed to meet their collective patrol requirements in the EEZ.

3.35
For 2009/10, NZDF had planned for collective patrols amounting to between 438 and 518 sea days (covering both civilian and military tasks). Between 93 and 113 sea days were planned for the offshore patrol ships (which were still to be delivered). Once the inshore patrol and offshore patrol ships are in service and available for operations, NZDF expects each ship to provide about 140 sea days a year (a total of 840 sea days) to cater for civilian patrol requirements, military patrol requirements, and training.

3.36
There is a big gap between the estimated civilian requirements and what NZDF has planned for, even when additional capacity from NZDF's new and upgraded ships and aircraft is taken into account. Because of this large gap, and because the original estimates of civilian requirements were made nearly 10 years ago, there is a clear need to re-assess the civilian patrol requirements. This assessment should draw on government agencies' own assessments of needs, risks, and resources.

3.37
We acknowledge that NZDF's commitment to supporting civilian patrols with its ships and aircraft has to be balanced against NZDF's own training and military readiness needs. However, a good understanding of government agencies' civilian patrol needs would link into wider planning of patrol needs and commitments. Robust information about agencies' patrol needs would be helpful to inform discussions about patrols, especially when decisions are made about the balance of NZDF's civilian and military patrol time, funding, and the need for NZDF to maintain the desired levels of capability.

3.38
As a starting point for monitoring and evaluating the use of the new and upgraded patrol ships and aircraft, we would expect the NMCC, NZDF, and the core agencies to establish better guidance on an appropriate level of patrolling. We consider that work in this area is fundamental to supporting a broader evaluation of patrol effectiveness and assessing whether patrol capability is adequately meeting needs.

Recommendation 2
We recommend that the National Maritime Co-ordination Centre, the New Zealand Defence Force, and government agencies using maritime patrols re-assess civilian patrol requirements to establish better guidance on an appropriate level of patrolling. This information is necessary for monitoring and evaluating the use of new and upgraded maritime patrol ships and aircraft. Guidance on an appropriate level of patrolling should be a starting point and should be reconsidered periodically as information on patrol needs and use improves, and as needs change over time.

Patrol co-ordination arrangements

There are some separate arrangements for co-ordinating maritime patrol that do not align well with the whole-of-government approach to patrol co-ordination that the NMCC was set up to achieve.

3.39
The Maritime Patrol Review's vision for a maritime co-ordination centre was for a single, independent, national centre that combined information management and operational activities for the civilian security of New Zealand's maritime areas. It would have responsibility for co-ordinating civilian maritime patrols for:

fisheries and marine resources management;

customs, immigration and [detecting or deterring] illegal activities;

marine safety, and search and rescue;

services provided to other countries (including those for military or foreign policy reasons); and

conservation, pollution monitoring and dealing with environmental contingencies.¹²

3.40
Cabinet directed the establishment of the NMCC with a mandate to manage "tasking" to meet civilian maritime surveillance needs. Governance documentation stated that the NMCC was the "entity from which all civilian-related maritime patrol and surveillance activities are co-ordinated."¹³

3.41
In our view, this was clearly stating that the NMCC should be a centralised co-ordination point for all civilian maritime patrols.

3.42
Although most government agencies' patrol requests were co-ordinated through the NMCC, there were some exceptions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the New Zealand Police participated in the NMCC but had separate patrol co-ordination arrangements. Figure 6 summarises the various patrol co-ordination arrangements in place at the time of our audit.

Figure 6
Patrol co-ordination arrangements for maritime patrols

Patrol area	Patrol co-ordination arrangement
EEZ patrols	National Maritime Co-ordination Centre co-ordinates patrols for civilian government agencies (excluding New Zealand Police). New Zealand Police liaises directly with the New Zealand Defence Force. National Maritime Co-ordination Centre not involved.
Southern Ocean patrols	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade leads cross-agency patrol co-ordination arrangement. National Maritime Co-ordination Centre involved in patrol co-ordination arrangement.
Pacific region patrols	Cross-agency patrol co-ordination arrangement involving a range of government agencies with maritime patrol interests. National Maritime Co-ordination Centre involved in patrol co-ordination arrangement including chairing of cross-agency group.

3.43
Some of the patrol arrangements that were not co-ordinated by the NMCC were informal arrangements that were in place before the NMCC was established. The New Zealand Police had a memorandum of understanding with NZDF that provided for wider access to NZDF's capability. Under this arrangement, the Police could request NZDF's aircraft or ships without involving the NMCC. The New Zealand Police's use of aircraft or ships would be deducted from NZDF's allocation of civilian maritime patrol hours or sea days.

3.44
At the time of our audit, NZDF did not have any surface patrol capability for use in the Southern Ocean. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade used aircraft to patrol this area. The Ministry's patrol use was deducted from the 400 flying hours made available for civilian maritime patrols.

3.45
Pacific region patrols had a dedicated allocation of 320 flying hours. NZDF provided these hours under a Chief of Defence Force Directive.¹⁴ There was no dedicated surface patrol resource for Pacific region patrols at the time of our audit.

3.46
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade considered that its patrol planning needs for Southern Ocean patrols and Pacific region patrols differed from those of other government agencies. It believed that:

it needed a separate patrol planning forum because its sensitive information could not always be able to be discussed openly, and using the NMCC for patrol co-ordination would impede discussion;
its patrols were different in that they needed co-ordination with other countries' patrol activities; and
foreign policy considerations needed to be incorporated into patrol co-ordination activities.

3.47
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade considered that its separate patrol co-ordination arrangements did not impede effective co-ordination because:

its membership of the NMCC Working Group enabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to keep the NMCC informed of its patrol needs;
the NMCC's participation in separate patrol co-ordination arrangements (see Figure 6) enabled the NMCC to be kept informed of any issues relating to wider maritime patrol co-ordination; and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's understanding was that Southern Ocean patrol needs would be prioritised alongside other New Zealand EEZ patrol requirements and, if another agency's need for patrol had a higher priority, then this would take precedence.

3.48
In our view, although separate patrol co-ordination arrangements did not align well with the single, centralised, co-ordination model envisaged by the Maritime Patrol Review, the arrangements did not appear to have a significant effect on the NMCC's ability to co-ordinate maritime patrol from a whole-of-government perspective. We also noted that the NMCC was involved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's alternative arrangements, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the New Zealand Police were, in general, small users of maritime patrols. Between January and December 2008, for example, those two agencies used 3% and 6% respectively of all maritime patrols.

3.49
The NMCC could not be sure that these figures accurately reflected these agencies' patrol use, because their patrol requests were not always processed through the NMCC. The New Zealand Police also noted disparities between its own records of patrol use and the NMCC's figures. After our audit, the New Zealand Police agreed with NZDF and the NMCC that Police requests for maritime patrol aircraft or ships would be submitted through the NMCC planning process.¹⁵ We consider this helpful in ensuring that accurate information about patrol use is recorded and supporting more effective co-ordination.

3.50
We consider that the need to discuss sensitive information does not necessarily require a separate co-ordination arrangement. We understand that all staff of the NMCC, and staff of all the organisations involved or interested in maritime patrols who attend NMCC planning meetings, have appropriate security clearances. We also understand that separate and private discussions can be held if need be. We found it difficult to understand the justification for Pacific patrols receiving a dedicated patrol allocation on the basis that these patrols support foreign policy and security interests. These interests are still New Zealand's interests and, as such, should probably be considered alongside New Zealand's EEZ patrolling needs – as was originally envisaged by the Maritime Patrol Review and Cabinet's directive to establish the NMCC. This joint consideration would enable the NMCC to take account of all government agencies' patrol needs when prioritising patrols. In our view, this was the original intent of establishing the NMCC.

3.51
We note that patrol co-ordination will become more complex as NZDF's new and upgraded aircraft and ships expand options for meeting government agencies' maritime patrol needs, and as agencies request more from these patrols. In this environment, the NMCC's role as a single, centralised, co-ordination centre will be crucial to ensuring that aircraft and ships are used effectively to meet all New Zealand's maritime patrol needs.

3.52
There is a risk that separate patrol co-ordination arrangements may result in less effective overall patrol co-ordination. The NMCC should monitor separate patrol co-ordination arrangements to ensure that this does not occur.

3.53
We understand that the NMCC intends to consolidate its governance documentation. As part of this task, there would be value in reviewing all existing patrol co-ordination arrangements to ensure that the reasons for separate arrangements are sound. Where they are still sound, the rationale and mandate for the separate arrangements should be recorded. It is important that these arrangements are visible to everyone involved, and do not lessen the effectiveness of patrol co-ordination. We consider that ODESC is the most appropriate group within the NMCC's governance structure to ensure this.

Recommendation 3
We recommend that the National Maritime Co-ordination Centre and government agencies using maritime patrols review whether separate patrol co-ordination arrangements are still needed. Where separate co-ordination arrangements are still needed, the rationale and mandate for these should be recorded.

Recommendation 4
We recommend that the National Maritime Co-ordination Centre monitor any separate patrol co-ordination arrangements and report on their effectiveness to the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination to help ensure that these arrangements do not lessen the effectiveness of patrol co-ordination.

Sharing information about the maritime domain

The NMCC was establishing what the government agencies' maritime information needs were, to inform improvements to its information-sharing systems.

3.54
The NMCC's roles include promoting the sharing of maritime information and contributing to awareness of maritime risks. The NMCC's success in these roles will, in part, depend on government agencies specifying their information needs. Successful information sharing is also limited by:

a lack of information about the maritime domain;
the concern of some agencies that the NMCC was trying to overstep its role;
technology and system compatibility issues between organisations; and
sensitivities about sharing classified information.

3.55
The NMCC had a significant work programme to define whole-of-government information needs about the maritime domain. This would contribute to its information-sharing systems. Ideally, the systems would enable a good understanding of the maritime domain from a whole-of-government point of view. This is about helping government agencies in managing risks, by allowing for early identification and communication of abnormal activities in the maritime domain. It complements rather than replaces the agencies' processes for identifying and acting on abnormal activities.

3.56
The NMCC was clear that this work was about tailoring what it produced to support the work of government agencies in managing their own risks. It was not about assuming responsibility for the agencies' risks. The NMCC also noted that any expansion of the NMCC's role would need careful co-ordination with all the organisations involved or interested in maritime patrols.

3.57
Distributing information on the maritime domain to all the organisations involved or interested in maritime patrols was an important task for the NMCC in fulfilling its information co-ordination role. The NMCC's ability to produce and distribute information about the maritime domain in a timely way was limited by the compatibility of government agencies' technology. Processes were labour-intensive because information had to be compiled manually. The NMCC was looking to automate these processes. There were also delays in introducing a common network for distributing information.

3.58
The security classifications used in collating maritime domain information were a further limitation. These security classifications meant that some collated information could not be shared fully with all organisations involved or interested in maritime patrols.

3.59
Having systems that support timely information sharing and risk identification will be increasingly important because more information is likely to be gathered from NZDF's new and upgraded ships and aircraft. We support the NMCC's efforts to establish more effective information sharing. We will maintain an interest in the progress of this work because encouraging the sharing of information about the maritime domain is an important part of the NMCC's role.

10: State Services Commission (2008), Factors for Successful Coordination – A Framework to Help State Agencies Coordinate Effectively, Wellington, page 11.

11: The 2002 Maritime Forces Review did not identify which agencies were consulted.

12: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (2001), Maritime Patrol Review, Wellington, page 35.

13: National Maritime Co-ordination Centre (2006), National Maritime Co-ordination Centre Governance Framework, Wellington, page 8; and NMCC Memorandum of Understanding between Reference Group Members, page 2.

14: Chief of Defence Force Directive 08/2000: NZDF Maritime Surveillance Operations in the South Pacific and Economic Exclusion Zones of Member Nations of the Forum Fisheries Agency.

15: In situations where the New Zealand Police needs access to NZDF capability that is not co-ordinated by the NMCC, the New Zealand Police will continue to put these requests to NZDF's Strategic Commitments Branch in keeping with the Police/NZDF memorandum of understanding.

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