Report of the
Controller and Auditor-General
Tumuaki o te Mana Arotake

New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East Timor

November 2001
Readers who are not familiar with all of the defence-related terms used in this report may find the terms explained in the glossary on pages 73-77.

We are grateful to the New Zealand Defence Force for supplying most of the illustrations used in this report.
Foreword

In September 1999 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel went into East Timor to restore peace and security as part of a multinational force (known as INTERFET) sanctioned by the United Nations. New Zealand personnel continue to serve in East Timor as part of a United Nations peace-keeping force (known as UNTAET).

This operation represents the largest deployment of New Zealand military personnel since the Korean conflict in the 1950s.

New Zealand’s participation in INTERFET was the result of months of planning and preparation. We examined the manner in which the NZDF went about planning for a possible military operation, and how it made preparations to assemble and train forces capable of achieving the mission alongside coalition partners.

Planning and deployment to East Timor – often under significant time pressure and in an environment of uncertainty – demanded collaboration and co-operation from all parts of the NZDF for what was to be a complex and large-scale military operation. The Navy, Army, and the Air Force were all directly involved in planning, mobilisation and deployment, and all three Services played important roles within INTERFET.

Mounting the East Timor operation put the NZDF’s military capability to the test. The successful deployment of the New Zealand force demonstrated the ability of the NZDF to work collectively in support of a common goal.

It was pleasing that we reached positive conclusions about the operation of NZDF systems, processes, and structures – especially in the light of our recent critical report on the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of new vehicles for the Army.

As could be expected, we also identified a number of areas for improvement. The NZDF has accepted our recommendations and has already initiated some changes.
Mindful of different audiences, we are publishing our findings in two different versions:

- as this summary report; and
- in more detail as issues papers on our web site www.oag.govt.nz

I hope that Parliament, the public, and other interested parties will all find the material of interest.

I thank the NZDF for its willing participation in our examination. A second examination of the roles performed by two particular elements of the New Zealand force in East Timor – helicopters and medical support – is under way, and we will publish the findings by the middle of 2002.

D J D Macdonald
Controller and Auditor-General

9 November 2001
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Part One

Background
### International Timeline of Events

#### 1999

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MARCH</td>
<td>Indonesia and Portugal agree that the people of East Timor should vote on independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL</td>
<td>Reports of killings in East Timorese villages as anti-independence supporters begin intimidation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>Indonesia and Portugal sign a set of agreements to ensure the peaceful conduct of the ballot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) is formally established, allowing for 280 civilian police and 50 military liaison officers to oversee the ballot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>Voter registration begins. Attacks on UN personnel reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>Violence occurs throughout the month in an effort to influence independence vote. Final day of polling on 30th. A total of 95% of registered voters cast ballots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPT</td>
<td>Result of vote announced on 3rd – 79% in favour of independence. UN workers evacuated from Dili after threats of violence from militia. Indonesian Government accepts multinational force. UN Resolution 1264 establishes International Force East Timor (INTERFET), to be led by Australia. New Zealand Company Group deploys to Dili on 30th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>UN Resolution 1272 establishes the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>Transition between INTERFET and UNTAET formally complete.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part One

BACKGROUND

The East Timor Operation

1.1 On 15 September 1999 a resolution of the UN Security Council authorised the establishment of a multinational force – known as INTERFET – to restore peace and security in East Timor. Less than a week later, the first New Zealand soldiers left to join their Navy and Air Force colleagues who were already operationally active within the multinational force being led by Australia. Figure 2 on pages 12-13 illustrates the Military Planning and Operations Timeline.

1.2 INTERFET was New Zealand’s largest overseas military deployment since the Korean conflict. At its peak, the NZDF had around 1,100 Navy, Army, and Air Force personnel committed to the multinational force. Large numbers of other personnel throughout the NZDF were involved in:

- planning for the operation;
- mobilising units and equipment; and
- transporting personnel, heavy military equipment, stores and supplies to East Timor.

1.3 In February 2000, INTERFET was replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping operation known as the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). New Zealand was given responsibility for Sector West (alongside Australia) – one of the four geographical sectors (Sectors East, Central, West and the enclave of Oecusse) assigned to the UNTAET peacekeeping force. The NZDF has since retained a Battalion Group there – the current total New Zealand contribution is between 650 and 700 personnel.

1.4 The area of operations assigned to the New Zealand force (alongside the Australian Force) covered some 1,700 square kilometres to the south-west of the country (including a long section of the border between East and West Timor) with the township of Suai as the base (see map on page 8). This area was characterised by poor infrastructure, difficult supply routes, limited communications, and considerable destruction by the retreating militia.

1.5 The New Zealand force sent to East Timor comprised elements from all three Services – details are provided in Figure 3 on page 14.
**1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>Initial scoping of possible NZDF contribution takes place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCH</td>
<td>Preliminary Threat Assessment completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL</td>
<td>Contingency planning well under way. First meeting of the East Timor Watch Group held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>First Military Threat Assessment completed. Paper to Cabinet outlines need for equipment enhancements. Some units are directed to undertake inoculation for Japanese Encephalitis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>First Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) presents options for deployment of a Battalion Group, known as OP CASTELL. Second JOPG presents options for deployment of a Company Group (OP FARINA).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| AUG   | Cabinet agrees to move selected force elements to a higher state of readiness.  
*OP FARINA force elements brought to shorter response times through direction of Cabinet.*  
*Force elements undertake training for APEC duties in September. Some of this training would also relate to East Timor duties.* |
### SEPT

Forward Planning Group goes to Australia.  

*Elements from all three Services begin APEC involvement from the beginning of the month.*

Land Command is nominated as Joint Command for all deploying force elements.  

*Government makes the frigate HMNZS *Te Kaha* available on the 8th to be part of multinational naval force.*  

*Company group withdrawn from APEC duties on the 10th to begin training for East Timor.*  

*APEC and state visits end on the 16th.*  

*INTERFET forces begin to deploy on the 20th.*

Cabinet approves deployment of Company Group.  

*First New Zealand force elements (Company Group) leave for Darwin on the 21st.*  

*HMNZS *Endeavour* operating with the naval taskforce by the 21st.*  

*Battalion group begins pre-deployment training on the 22nd.*  

*HMNZS *Te Kaha* departs for Gulf on the 25th.*  

*HMNZS *Canterbury* is operating within Timor waters by the 28th.*  

*Three Air Force helicopters begin operations in Dili, East Timor, on the 28th.*  

*Company Group deploys to Dili in East Timor on the 30th.*

### OCT

Ministerial approval given for deployment of Battalion Group.  

Cabinet approves deployment of Battalion Group.  

*Company Group deploys to Suai in Sector West region of East Timor on the 15th.*  

*Battalion Group fully deployed by the 26th.*  

*By the 29th six helicopters were in Timor, allowing four to be available for operations.*
**Figure 3**  
*Forces Deployed to East Timor*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVY</th>
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</thead>
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| Three Navy ships, comprising:  
  - two combat vessels (frigates) that conducted escort, surveillance and patrolling duties; and  
  - one fleet replenishment ship that provided support to land forces (fuel and logistics), augmented the Australian fuel supply, and conducted re-supply to the multinational naval Task Force.  
Up to 450 personnel. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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</table>
| An Army Battalion Group of up to 830 personnel – including two infantry Companies and a surveillance and reconnaissance Company, along with engineer, logistics and medical elements.  
The Battalion Group was responsible for monitoring militia activity within New Zealand’s assigned area of operation and carrying out regular patrols. The area of operation covers some 1,700 square kilometres of rugged terrain, and includes a section of the border between East and West Timor. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>An Air Force element of 130 personnel (including aircraft crews and mechanics) and up to six Iroquois helicopters used in support of New Zealand and other nations’ ground forces. Two Hercules and one Boeing aircraft transported troops and equipment between New Zealand, Australia and East Timor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.6 Up to 15 additional NZDF personnel were stationed in Australia providing support to the New Zealand force in East Timor.

1.7 The Government’s decision to send a military force to East Timor put the NZDF’s military capability to the test. The East Timor operation provided a valuable opportunity to assess whether, in practice, the NZDF could meet its stated capability requirements. These were:

- planning effectively for a possible military operation; and
- assembling and deploying a force which would enable it to carry out its assigned mission in accordance with the Government’s objectives.

1.8 The NZDF has some 15,000 personnel (9,200 in uniform), assets of $3,300 million, and an annual operating budget of $1,400 million. The NZDF is funded to maintain a level of military capability agreed with the Government. Military capability has two elements:

- the personnel and equipment to carry out a variety of military tasks; and
- the ability to prepare a military force for operation within a specified period of time, deploy that force, and sustain it for a given period.

1.9 The NZDF trains and maintains its forces in accordance with requirements specified in its Purchase Agreement with the Minister of Defence. Those requirements define the standards to which the NZDF is required to maintain its personnel and equipment so as to respond to any one or more situations in which the Government may decide to deploy a military force.

1.10 It is too expensive to constantly maintain a broad range of force elements at a fully operational level. Consequently, the NZDF is funded to keep units at a directed level of capability (DLOC) – from which they can be raised to an operational level of capability (OLOC) within a specified time and given appropriate additional resources.

1.11 The processes of planning for a possible military operation, mobilising a force, and deploying that force to East Timor, were all complex. They involved systems and personnel across all three Services – the Navy, Army, and the Air Force. Few NZDF personnel were not involved in preparing for the military operation in some way. Sustaining the operation continues to consume significant NZDF resources.
Levels of Military Operations

1.12 Military operations involve three levels:
- tactical (or means);
- operational (or ways); and
- strategic (or ends).

1.13 The relationship between those three levels and the places of the key players in relation to the levels are illustrated in Figure 4 below.

**Figure 4**
Levels of Military Operations and Key Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The three levels of military operations</th>
<th>Where key players fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC (ENDS)</td>
<td>The Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defines security objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL (WAYS)</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is responsible for developing and conducting any military component of the security objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL (MEANS)</td>
<td>Joint Planning Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducts contingency planning to develop possible military options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has overall responsibility for all deployed NZ forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Operational Planning Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develops the military options in more detail and is responsible for preparing the necessary forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Elements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How We Are Reporting

1.14 We are reporting the results of our work in three parts:

- this report;
- companion issues papers that describe certain aspects in more detail; and
- a second report, which will be about the roles performed by two specific components of the New Zealand force – the Air Force’s Iroquois helicopters and Army’s medical support.

1.15 The remainder of this report comprises a Summary and Recommendations (Part Two, pages 19-29) and five substantive parts:

- Part Three (pages 31-36) describes what we looked at in terms of our objectives, how we went about achieving them, and our expectations of good practice.
- Part Four (pages 37-41) sets out how the NZDF managed different aspects of risk, and comments on the issues emerging from our examination of NZDF structures, systems, and processes.
- Part Five (pages 43-53) reviews the strengths and successes highlighted by the East Timor operation.
- Part Six (pages 55-63) notes issues for the NZDF to consider.
- Part Seven (pages 65-71) summarises the lessons learned from the East Timor operation.

1.16 The companion issues papers report in more detail on the following topics:

- Paper 1: Operational Preparedness Reporting System
- Paper 2: Contingency Planning
- Paper 3: Operational Planning
- Paper 4: Pre-deployment Training
- Paper 5: Contracting for Civilian Services
- Paper 6: Public Relations, Parliamentary Reporting and Financial Management
- Paper 7: Lessons Learned.

1.17 The issues papers are available on our web site www.oag.govt.nz
Part Two
Summary and Recommendations
How Well Did the NZDF Respond?

**Our Overall Assessment**

2.1 The East Timor deployment presented the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) with a unique set of military, organisational, and environmental circumstances that may not be replicated in the future. We cannot assess how the NZDF might perform given a different operational context. However, we are confident that our assessment has identified system and organisational issues that will be generally applicable.

2.2 Subject to the limited scope of our examination (see paragraphs 3.1 to 3.7), in our view the NZDF for the most part met its obligations well in responding:

- first to the possibility of participating in military engagement in East Timor; and
- later, to the Government’s decision that New Zealand should participate in the multinational force in East Timor.

2.3 In particular:

- NZDF’s planning for a possible military operation was intense, flexible, and responsive; and

- the NZDF –
  - assembled and deployed the required military force within the times set by the Government; and
  - successfully positioned the force within the United Nations Multinational Force.

2.4 Preparing for a possible military operation, mobilising personnel, assembling equipment, and deploying forces involving all three Services, were demanding tasks. The NZDF performed these tasks with a large degree of success:

- under the pressure of tight timetables;
- in a constantly changing environment; and
- often with limited resources.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2.5 Some aspects of the NZDF’s preparations and operations could have been better performed, and the NZDF has itself identified important lessons from the East Timor operation. Indeed, the NZDF is already making some important changes to remedy identified system weaknesses.

2.6 Two of the most important changes that have been made are:

- The formation of a Joint Forces Headquarters, which should give a clearer focus to planning, the assessment and reporting of force preparedness, training, continuous improvement, and military operations.

- Political commitment to a multi-year capital expenditure programme. Mission-critical equipment deficiencies posed a significant capability risk to the NZDF as it prepared for a possible deployment to East Timor. The Government’s May 2001 policy statement signalled its intention to fund a multi-year capital expenditure programme to address identified capability shortfalls.

Monitoring and Reporting Preparedness

2.7 Before the Government’s decision to deploy forces to East Timor, the NZDF’s Operational Preparedness and Reporting System (OPRES) had already identified those equipment deficiencies and manning and skill shortfalls that would have to be addressed should the Government take such a decision. The NZDF was therefore able to carry out informed and timely planning, and address the previously identified deficiencies.

2.8 We did note, however, the potential for the NZDF to enhance OPRES by making the reporting system more comprehensive and relevant to joint planning and training across the three Services – the Navy, Army, and the Air Force. OPRES also needs to be more clearly integrated with the maintenance and development of military capability, and should enable analysis of trends in preparedness ratings.

2.9 The shortfalls in military capability that the NZDF identified created a number of risks that it had to manage within limited times. The mission-essential tasks included upgrading of Armoured Personnel Carriers, inoculation of personnel, conduct of pre-deployment training, and chartering of civilian transport. The NZDF carried out these tasks within a limited time, and obtained timely expenditure approval where necessary.
Contingency and Strategic Planning

2.10 Information gathered from overseas intelligence network partners met a range of needs by:
- feeding into the NZDF’s strategic planning;
- helping the NZDF to begin contingency planning at an early stage; and
- providing operational information about the environment into which a military force might be sent.

2.11 Interdepartmental groups of officials facilitated the sharing of strategic intelligence and decision-making, and assisted the NZDF in shaping contingency planning for a possible deployment. However, the NZDF did not have unrestricted access to all available overseas intelligence sources.

2.12 A Joint Planning Group undertook strategic planning for the East Timor operation at NZDF Headquarters. The NZDF put in place an effective strategic planning structure to ensure that:
- strategic planning drew on a range of skills and experience;
- different force options were considered;
- planners had direct access to the highest levels of decision-making; and
- the views of the single Services – the Navy, Army, and the Air Force – were incorporated as required.

2.13 This strategic planning structure worked well. However, the Joint Planning Group did not have an explicit mandate and terms of reference – creating the potential for differing interpretations of the Group’s roles and responsibilities. Systematic meeting records were not kept, and this made it difficult to follow those processes and deliberations that led to key courses of action taken by senior NZDF personnel.

Operational Planning

2.14 A Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) was assigned the task of translating strategic decisions into operational plans for a likely military mission. The JOPG played an important role in:
- directing planning;
- monitoring force preparedness; and
- overseeing the preparations undertaken by the three Services.
2.15 Because of time constraints, deploying units did not always receive the necessary formal direction and guidance in a timely manner. Security policies and practices sometimes hindered access by planners and training personnel to useful operational information. These factors created the potential for training and other pre-deployment preparation to be inconsistent with the goals that were set for the mission.

**Pre-deployment Training**

2.16 Army units did not have access to standing contingency training plans from which to readily develop a training programme for soldiers preparing to deploy to East Timor. Access to such plans would have made the development of a training programme more efficient, and minimised the risk that some tasks might be overlooked.

2.17 Formal orders would have provided useful confirmation of tasks and mission focus, along with detailed training requirements. Such orders were not always issued to deploying units, or were issued too late to be useful for pre-deployment training.

2.18 The pre-deployment training that was carried out focused on strengthening core skills and competencies, and on tasks assessed as being most relevant to the New Zealand mission. Training of individual personnel was conducted across the full range of these tasks and competencies.

2.19 Time constraints limited the depth and breadth of collective training that was able to be conducted. Time pressures and concurrent commitments to Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum security duties also limited time available for joint training. As a result, commanders did not have a full opportunity to become familiar with the skills and procedures involved in co-ordinating force elements.

**Contracting for Civilian Services**

2.20 The NZDF faced a number of risks associated with the need to upgrade or purchase critical equipment. Contracts and standing agreements were useful mechanisms in assisting the NZDF to meet tight deadlines.

2.21 The NZDF also used civilian resources to transport a large amount of heavy equipment and stores to East Timor. It successfully managed the risks associated with such arrangements, chartering one aircraft and two vessels within a limited time.
Public Relations and Financial Management

2.22 Conscious of Parliamentary and public interest, the NZDF developed an active media and public relations strategy for the East Timor operation. The strategy helped to ensure that key messages were effectively and clearly communicated.

2.23 The NZDF’s Annual Reports have contained useful information about activities in East Timor. But the commitment in East Timor inevitably affects the NZDF’s capability to perform its other roles, and its accountability documents need to more adequately reflect this impact.

2.24 Financial management of the East Timor deployment was generally well done, with appropriate controls in place.

Learning Lessons from East Timor

2.25 All three Services have drawn valuable lessons from their involvement in East Timor.

2.26 Army has adopted a formal “lessons learned” model, and has drawn on its operational experience to refine training for successive Battalion Group rotations to East Timor. However, Army’s Centre for Army Lessons Learned was not adequately resourced, nor did it have access to all sources of lessons learned.

2.27 The Services do not approach the analysis and promulgation of operational and strategic lessons learned in a co-ordinated, transparent, and systematic way – creating the potential that the NZDF (and the single Services) will miss important opportunities to improve military practice.

2.28 The formation of the new Joint Forces Headquarters at Trentham from July 2001 provides the potential to strengthen the focus on joint planning, training, operations, continuous improvement, and best military practice across all three Services.
Recommendations

2.29 Drawing on our examination and observations, we make the following recommendations for improvement to NZDF practices.

Monitoring and Reporting Preparedness

2.30 The NZDF should further develop its operational preparedness reporting system to enable it to:

• measure and report on each Service’s preparedness to contribute to a joint force;
• report on the preparedness status of all NZDF units;
• analyse trends in preparedness ratings; and
• integrate preparedness reporting with development systems responsible for maintaining and enhancing force capability.

Contingency Planning

2.31 The NZDF should:

• review intelligence needs and access in light of the East Timor experience; and
• define formally the mandate and terms of reference for groups assigned the task of undertaking strategic planning for future military contingencies, and document strategic decision-making processes and deliberations more fully.

Operational Planning

2.32 The NZDF should review security policies and practices to ensure that timely and relevant operational information is available:

• to assist in force preparation and deployment; and
• for dissemination to the single Services.
**Pre-deployment Training**

2.33 The NZDF should:

- ensure that all deploying units receive timely direction, guidance and oversight from the operational level – especially with regard to the timely issue of formal orders; and

- develop more comprehensive training information and formulate guidance directly relevant to New Zealand’s force structure and likely scenarios.

**Contracting for Civilian Services**

2.34 The NZDF should:

- ensure that it has clearly stated air and sealift strategies in place, and establish procedures to mitigate the risks associated with securing and utilising civilian transport charters;

- promote the use of contracts and standing agreements as a means of drawing on non-military resources (such as air or sea transport) at short notice, to supplement its own resources and capability; and

- consider the lessons to be drawn for equipment life-cycle planning and for investment in key capabilities.

**Public Relations and Financial Accountability**

2.35 The NZDF should review the format and content of the Purchase Agreement with the Minister of Defence and its Forecast Report to better illustrate the impacts of the East Timor deployment on:

- individual Output Classes;

- the cumulative impact on NZDF capability;

- capability and preparedness over time; and

- the NZDF’s preparedness to conduct joint operations.
Lessons Learned

2.36 Army should strengthen the analytical capability of the Centre for Army Lessons Learned to enable it to:

- carry out its full range of tasks in an effective manner;
- take a vigorous leadership role in analysing and promulgating lessons learned; and
- draw on a wider range of information sources for possible lessons from the East Timor deployment.

2.37 The NZDF should document all steps in the process of evaluating lessons in a formal, systematic and transparent way. Clear responsibility should be assigned within each Service for considering operational and strategic observations in the light of military doctrine, policies, and procedures.

2.38 The NZDF should also establish a common “lessons learned” model and set of principles, centrally managed, with a view to –

- managing a process of continuous improvement which collates “lessons learned” data across the three Services;
- identifying impacts for joint training, capability, exercises and operations – drawing on information from the Joint Forces Headquarters; and
- promulgating best military practice.

Joint Forces Headquarters

2.39 The Joint Forces Headquarters (established from July 2001 – see Figure 5 opposite) should provide the framework to address a number of issues arising from our analysis of preparedness and capability reporting systems, and from the lessons that the NZDF has itself drawn from the East Timor operation.

2.40 The NZDF should consider assigning the Joint Forces Headquarters the following tasks:

- reporting on joint force preparedness, and analysis of joint preparedness trends;
- managing operational aspects of intelligence gathering, and the dissemination of intelligence information to the assigned joint force; and
- maintaining force-wide skills and experience in operating as part of a coalition force – and the ability to operate alongside other forces – through ongoing joint training and combined exercises.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Figure 5
Structure of the NZDF

New Zealand Defence Force

Chief of Defence Force

The Chief of Defence Force retains overall responsibility for all New Zealand military forces.

Navy
Chief of Naval Staff

Army
Chief of General Staff

Air Force
Chief of Air Staff

Joint Forces HQ
est. 1 July 2001

In peacetime the three Chiefs of Staff are responsible for raising and maintaining force elements at the required level of capability.

Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
The Joint Commander has responsibility for deployed forces. During peacetime the Joint Commander is responsible for directing the joint/combined activities of forces assigned by the three Services.

Component Commanders
Each Service has a representative as part of the Joint Forces HQ. They facilitate information flows between the single Services and the Joint Forces HQ and ensure Consultation.
Part Three

What We Looked At
Our Objectives

3.1 Our objectives were to describe and assess the systems used by the NZDF to:
- plan for a possible military operation;
- prepare a joint force; and
- deploy that force to East Timor.

3.2 We also examined the systems by which the NZDF has reviewed its military practice and processes in the light of the East Timor experience; and we assessed the extent to which the NZDF has identified lessons for future contingents and implemented necessary changes.

3.3 The deployment of New Zealand forces to help restore and maintain peace and security in East Timor has attracted significant public interest across the country. To help the reader of our report, we set out to describe military systems and processes in simple terms, and to explain to Parliament and other public audiences how a military operation is planned and executed.

3.4 We are also examining the roles performed by two specific components of the NZDF’s contribution – the Air Force’s Iroquois helicopters and Army’s medical support. We plan to report our findings from that examination in the first half of 2002.

How We Went About Achieving Them

3.5 The scale and complexity of the East Timor deployment made it necessary to limit the scope of what we looked at to selected aspects of the operation. We focused on the NZDF’s planning for the first phase of its military involvement in East Timor. The planning took place over the period February to October 1999.

3.6 Planning and deployment of a military force required the NZDF to manage a variety of risks. We selected for examination systems or processes that had a direct and critical impact on:
- the NZDF’s ability to respond effectively to the Government’s decision to send a military force to East Timor;
- the preparedness of the New Zealand force; and
- the mobilisation and deployment of the New Zealand force.
WHAT WE LOOKED AT

3.7 Accordingly, we examined the NZDF’s systems for:

- monitoring and reporting the state of preparedness of military personnel and equipment;
- considering contingencies for a possible New Zealand military involvement;
- planning the East Timor military operation;
- conducting pre-deployment training;
- preparing critical equipment, and chartering civilian transport vessels and aircraft;
- managing public accountability and financial issues; and
- reviewing the East Timor experience, and the main lessons learned.

3.8 We interviewed selected NZDF personnel at all levels and analysed relevant documentation. We discussed East Timor issues with representatives from all three Services, and in May 2001 travelled to East Timor to observe the operations of the New Zealand force stationed there.

Our Expectations of Good Practice

3.9 We developed broad expectations of good practice against which to evaluate the NZDF’s response to the Government’s decision on military involvement in East Timor. Our expectations are set out in Figure 6 on pages 35-36.
### Figure 6
**Our Expectations of Good Practice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring and Reporting Readiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The NZDF would have known the state of preparedness of individual force elements, and the tasks, costs and timeframes for addressing known deficiencies in capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With this knowledge, the NZDF would have been in a position to respond effectively to the Government’s decision to send a military force to East Timor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contingency Planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic planning would have been well informed and coordinated, and the Government kept advised of critical paths and force options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A joint approach would have been adopted from the outset of the planning process, in recognition of the fact that a deployment of the Navy, Army, and the Air Force was likely to be required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lines of authority and accountability would be clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Thorough consideration of options and identification of key lead times would have enabled the NZDF to make early preparations for a possible military operation, and to respond effectively and in a timely manner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning the Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The operational planning structure would have been assigned clear responsibilities and would have facilitated effective co-ordination and communication between Defence Force Headquarters and the single Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Timely and relevant direction and guidance would have been given to deploying units, and facilitating mobilisation, training, and deployment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-deployment Training</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Pre-deployment training would have drawn on detailed, timely and relevant training plans, and knowledge of the conditions in which force elements would be operating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training would have focused on those tasks required for the mission – building on existing skills and including joint operations to ensure that each Service is capable of operating with personnel and equipment from the other Services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Contracting for Civilian Services

- The single Services would have
  - identified at an early stage the requirement to address any equipment deficiencies;
  - defined the costs and timescales for undertaking such work; and
  - managed the necessary contracts to provide appropriate project oversight.
- Contracts or similar arrangements would have been in place to enable the NZDF to respond quickly to a notice to prepare for a possible deployment.

### Public Relations and Financial Management

- The NZDF would have adopted an active public relations strategy to keep Parliament and the public informed about matters relating to New Zealand’s military involvement in East Timor.
- NZDF accountability documents would accurately reflect NZDF activities and capabilities and would report the achievements in East Timor.
- The NZDF would have in place adequate financial controls over operational expenditure, and would be able to account for and report on the financial impact of the East Timor operation.

### Learning Lessons from East Timor

- The NZDF would have systems and processes for identifying and analysing lessons from the East Timor experience, and for translating such lessons into improved military practice.
- Each of the single Services would have reviewed its involvement in East Timor, drawing lessons for future military operations.
4.1 We identified the need to manage a number of risks as a key task for the NZDF. This part of the report describes the main risks and the NZDF’s broad response to them.

4.2 At all stages of planning and deployment, the NZDF faced uncertainties that might have had adverse effects on the success of the deployment. It was therefore important that these uncertainties were managed in an effective manner. The risks that the NZDF had to manage in planning and deploying a military force took a number of forms:

- uncertainty about the future political and military environment affecting East Timor;
- uncertainty about the nature and timeframe for any military contribution required of New Zealand;
- changing response times and force requirements; and
- a limited time to prepare its force for a possible operation.

Figure 7
Timeline for NZDF Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February 1999</th>
<th>March → September</th>
<th>September/October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Government and NZDF officials recognised an emerging requirement for a possible New Zealand military involvement in East Timor.</td>
<td>More detailed planning was undertaken, including operational planning at later stages.</td>
<td>The first New Zealand force deployed in September and consisted of a Company Group, four helicopters, and naval vessels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency planning was initiated.</td>
<td>Joint force preparations were undertaken, and coalition issues were discussed with Australia.</td>
<td>In October this force was expanded to Battalion Group size with the arrival of remaining troops and two extra helicopters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NZDF planning for a possible military operation took place against the background of a volatile political and military environment in East Timor. The NZDF was obliged to adapt its military planning to:

- a changing environment;
- the focus of any United Nations’ resolution;
- the likely structure of the multinational force; and
- the requirements of the lead nation.

In addition, the focus and timeline for NZDF planning were influenced by the intentions of the UN and the likely responses of coalition partners – in particular, the lead times and force requirements determined by the Australian Defence Force as leader of the multinational force.

The evolving political and military situation in East Timor required the NZDF to review and adapt its planning assumptions to ensure that it was able to respond in an effective and timely manner to any decision by the Government. This demanded flexibility in force planning, lead times, and deployment.

In preparing for a possible deployment, the NZDF needed to undertake various tasks critical to successful preparation and deployment of a military force. Mission-critical tasks were:

- purchase and enhancement of key equipment;
- inoculation of personnel;
- conduct of mission-specific training; and
- securing charters to transport personnel and equipment to East Timor.

The NZDF needed to meet a critical path for completing these tasks in order to deploy a combat-capable military force within the necessary time. The NZDF assessed that failure to meet the deadlines would expose it to significant risks.
4.8 The NZDF managed risk through flexible planning and a focus on mission-critical tasks. It was successful in deploying a large military force within the response times agreed with the Government. The experience of the NZDF in preparing for the East Timor operation and participating in the multinational force alongside Australia and other coalition partners has provided valuable lessons for future military processes and practice.

4.9 Our examination also identified aspects of planning, force preparation and deployment, in which the NZDF has the potential to improve its future practices.

4.10 The situation in East Timor provided both the Government and the NZDF with the opportunity to conduct a considerable amount of contingency planning. This amount of time may not be available for future crises.
Part Five
Strengths and Successes
5.1 The East Timor deployment highlighted the strengths of many key NZDF systems and processes. These strengths contributed to the successful planning and deployment of the New Zealand INTERFET contingent.

**Operational Preparedness Reporting System**

5.2 The NZDF’s Operational Preparedness Reporting System (OPRES) measures the preparedness of individual force units at regular intervals. Figure 8 on page 46 illustrates how OPRES works within, for example, the Navy.

5.3 OPRES enables the Chief of Defence Force to report against the requirements of the Purchase Agreement with the Minister of Defence, and to keep the Minister and the Government informed of the state of force capability – including any shortfalls.

5.4 OPRES reports for the period immediately preceding the East Timor operation recorded those key capability and preparedness shortfalls that needed to be addressed in planning for a possible deployment. Capability deficiencies were known, enabling the NZDF to carry out informed and timely planning. The NZDF was thereby able to take appropriate action to address such deficiencies, and obtain timely approval from the Government where necessary.

5.5 However, we noted potential for the NZDF to make OPRES:

- more comprehensive;
- more relevant to joint planning by the Navy, Army, and the Air Force; and
- more integrated with capability development.
The Inspector-General Navy receives the collated report and is able to utilise the other Branches of the Naval Staff (Development, Personnel, etc) to rectify outstanding deficiencies. Any that cannot be fixed are reported as part of the Inspector General’s OPRES report to the Chief of Naval Staff.

The Maritime Commander analyses the individual OPRES reports, collates them into a single report, and is able to fix any deficiencies within his authority.

Individual ship commanders complete OPRES reports and send them to the Maritime Commander.
Intelligence for Contingency Planning

5.6 Once a commitment to preparations for an operation in East Timor looked probable, intelligence network partners provided information that met a wide range of the NZDF’s strategic planning needs, and helped the NZDF to begin contingency planning at an early stage. Figure 9 on page 48 describes the contingency planning process.

5.7 Access to a variety of intelligence sources gave the NZDF useful information about the environment into which it might be directed to send a military force. At the same time, the NZDF did not have access to all involved overseas intelligence sources. As a result, operational information needs were not always fully met.

5.8 Direct participation in planning for the multinational force provided the NZDF with a range of information that was helpful for shaping its own contribution. Intelligence reports have continued to provide the NZDF with information on which to base its ongoing planning and training for New Zealand’s continued involvement in East Timor as part of the UNTAET.

5.9 Interdepartmental groups facilitated the sharing of intelligence and the development of advice to Ministers. Interdepartmental networks were an important means of keeping the Government informed, and of seeking key decisions when needed. As circumstances changed (such as the political and military situation in East Timor), the NZDF was able to modify planning assumptions and shape its preparations for a possible deployment.

Contingency Planning

5.10 The NZDF put in place an effective structure to plan for a range of military contingencies. A Joint Planning Group undertook strategic planning for the East Timor operation at the NZDF headquarters. The Joint Planning Group played an important role in monitoring and analysing developments in East Timor, developing a range of options to meet political and military goals, and maintaining links with other departments and the Government. It also had direct access to the highest levels of decision-making within the NZDF.
Figure 9
The Contingency Planning Process

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
As soon as a situation develops intelligence reports are gathered. These form the basis of initial contingency planning and feed into all later stages of the process.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING PROCESS BEGINS:

Conceptual Proposal
A range of military options is developed after considering issues such as threat assessments, the political situation, likely timescale and likely tasks.

Needs Analysis
Detailed lists are drawn up of what personnel, equipment and transportation will be required to carry out the identified courses of action.

Analysis is undertaken to identify which critical personnel issues or pieces of equipment present a risk to being able to produce the required capability.

Capability Shortfalls & Risks
The costs and time needed to address the capability shortfalls are identified for funding and planning purposes.

Costs & Times to Complete

Cabinet Approval for Expenditure
5.11 The Joint Planning Group drew on a wide range of skills and experience across the NZDF, as well as including appropriate single Service staff. Composition of the group ensured that strategic planning was broadly based – taking account of different sets of issues and incorporating the views of the single Services as required. However, we concluded that the roles and decision-making processes of the Joint Planning Group and Chiefs of Staff Committee could have been better documented.

**Operational Planning**

5.12 Clear responsibility for managing operational planning tasks was assigned to a Joint Operational Planning Group established initially at Air Command HQ and later at Land Command HQ. This planning structure promoted effective liaison between strategic and operational planners, and facilitated the process of translating strategic objectives into operational instructions and guidance to the three Services. The Joint Operational Planning Group had a diverse membership, and included planners from the Joint Planning Group (paragraph 5.10) and the three Services. Planning was undertaken in four stages as shown in Figure 10 below.

**Figure 10**

**Planning Stages of the Joint Operational Planning Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Four Planning Stages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>One</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Three</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Four</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.13 The Joint Operational Planning Group played an important role in directing planning by the three Services, monitoring force preparedness, and providing oversight of the preparations undertaken by each of the three Services. However, units being deployed did not always receive the necessary formal guidance in a timely manner.

5.14 Forward planning to prepare a joint force for a possible deployment was timely and effective. The NZDF drew up critical paths that identified key lead times and deadlines to complete critical planning tasks and address known capability deficiencies.

Identifying Critical Deficiencies

5.15 The NZDF identified early those tasks that were vital to the success of any possible deployment and had the longest lead times, and sought approval to begin the necessary contingency planning. These timelines enabled the NZDF to seek timely Government approval for necessary expenditure.

5.16 Upgrading of Army’s Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) was a case in point. The NZDF noted early in 1999 that any deployment would require APCs for the protection of infantry soldiers, and that these vehicles would need to be upgraded. Cabinet was informed of this need at an early stage and approved funding. The upgrading work began promptly.

5.17 An intense focus on planning and contingency preparations contributed significantly to the NZDF’s preparedness and ability to respond. A number of factors made military planning uncertain. The NZDF developed a range of force options, and adjusted its planning assumptions as circumstances changed. A flexible set of planning assumptions enabled the NZDF to change the shape of its proposed military force and move to different response times, as the East Timor situation evolved and with it the Government’s likely requirements.

5.18 The NZDF kept the Minister of Defence well informed on progress with contingency planning, and of the costs, limitations and risks associated with force options and response times. Cabinet was given early notification of the need for equipment enhancements to enable the NZDF to perform those tasks likely to be assigned to a New Zealand force in East Timor. Costs and contractual implications were clearly stated.
5.19 Early guidance available to deploying units included the scope of the likely military mission, the tasks a New Zealand force could be called on to perform, and time limits for training. Useful briefing material of a general nature was compiled on the environment in East Timor, although some specific information (such as the area of operation assigned to the New Zealand force) was not available until shortly before the first New Zealand contingent began to deploy.

Pre-deployment Training

5.20 Pre-deployment training is a vital component of moving force elements to a state of operational readiness. Without the required training, military personnel can be put at unnecessary risk, and the force may not be capable of carrying out its assigned tasks – either on its own or as part of a joint or coalition force.

5.21 The training unit for the first battalion to be deployed was successful in developing and delivering a pre-deployment training programme. Training programmes were developed from a range of general sources within limited time. Access to more detailed standing guidance relevant to likely operational scenarios for a New Zealand deployment would have made development of a training programme more efficient.

5.22 Training focused on strengthening core skills and competencies, and on tasks assessed as being most relevant to the New Zealand mission. Deploying units were trained on the basis of the most current information available. Some specific information about the environment and military threat, as well as the scope and location of the engagement, was not known.

5.23 Individual training was conducted covering a variety of tasks and competencies. However, time constraints limited the depth and breadth of training able to be conducted at a collective level.

5.24 As a result, company commanders did not have the full opportunity to become familiar with the skills and procedures involved in co-ordinating force elements with capabilities such as helicopters and APCs. Helicopters were not available for joint training because they were deployed on APEC Forum operations and the necessary personnel were undergoing their own pre-deployment training and preparation.
5.25 The NZDF has reviewed the effectiveness of training delivered to the first contingent – identifying those core skills and competencies that operational experience in East Timor has shown need to be strengthened. The NZDF has also refined its training of subsequent battalions on the basis of lessons learned from East Timor operations.

5.26 Major equipment deficiencies were known and clearly identified by the NZDF. Early identification of mission-critical equipment deficiencies enabled the NZDF to develop a critical planning path and to put a timely case before the Government for additional funding to carry out equipment purchases or upgrades. User requirements or specifications were well defined, suppliers identified, and contracts effectively managed with due regard to time limitations.

Contracting for Civilian Services

5.27 The NZDF faced tight deadlines to carry out the necessary enhancement or upgrading work. Standing agreements or contracts proved valuable tools in enabling the NZDF to respond at short notice. Partnership relationships with key contractors and suppliers are an important factor in securing the necessary co-operation and commitment to meet tight deadlines. The NZDF was successful in completing this work before the first contingent left at the end of September 1999.

5.28 The NZDF’s experience in engaging civilian resources and expertise to supplement its own resources highlighted the value of putting in place standing agreements for the delivery of services when contingencies arise. Such arrangements provide a flexible contractual framework within which to engage critical services at short notice.

5.29 Logistics planners anticipated the need to use civilian resources to transport equipment to East Timor. Indicative loading lists were developed early as the basis for determining the type and capacity of aircraft and vessels required. However, contracts could only be negotiated once decisions had been made on force structure and deployment sequences. By using brokers, the NZDF successfully chartered one aircraft and two vessels (within a limited time) to transport battalion equipment and stores to Australia for trans-shipping to East Timor.
Informing the Public

5.30 The NZDF responded positively to public interest in the East Timor operation. The operation also provided Parliament with the opportunity to consider issues of military planning, capability and sustainment, within the context of a large-scale military deployment.

5.31 The NZDF developed a media strategy and provided assistance to media organisations to ensure that clear and consistent messages were delivered. The strategy, while not fully comprehensive, had well-defined objectives of:

- providing a continual flow of information of interest to the New Zealand public from the area of operations in East Timor; and
- clearly communicating key messages during the operation.

Reporting to Parliament

5.32 The commitment of resources to East Timor since September 1999 has had significant impacts on NZDF activities, funding, and capability. We analysed NZDF accountability documents to establish to what extent such impacts were disclosed.

5.33 Our analysis of the NZDF accountability documents has raised some concerns, but there are positive aspects to the NZDF’s reporting through its accountability documents. Positive aspects include:

- The use of the single Output Class 16 for reporting on current military operations such as East Timor (this provides an opportunity to clearly distinguish and report on the impacts of such activities).

- The introduction to the NZDF Annual Report for 1999/2000 contained some financial and non-financial information about the activities that had taken place in East Timor. (In addition, the report made some reference to the potential future problems associated with a longer-term commitment in East Timor.)

5.34 Operational expenditure demands systems of financial management, authorities, and reporting that differ from those normally followed by the NZDF. The NZDF’s financial management systems supported the deployment of military personnel to East Timor. The costs relating to the deployment were clearly accounted for through the establishment of specific cost centres, and appropriate delegations were in place.
Part Six

Issues for NZDF Consideration
6.1 The NZDF was successful in planning and deploying a military force to East Timor. However, our examination identified a number of issues for the NZDF to consider.

Operational Preparedness Reporting System

6.2 We observed that OPRES had some limitations:

- Reports did not readily illustrate the NZDF’s ability to assemble a joint force.
- Reports did not illustrate the extent to which preparedness deficiencies within an individual unit might affect the preparedness of associated force elements.
- The system did not report on the preparedness of all NZDF units (such as some command and support groups). As a result, OPRES did not present a full picture of preparedness across the NZDF.
- It was not always clear from OPRES how low preparedness ratings would be improved, at what cost, and within what time. There was no direct relationship between the reporting of low preparedness ratings and the NZDF’s systems for maintaining and enhancing capability. Clear project accountability needed to be assigned to ensure that action plans were in place to address instances where preparedness was assigned a low rating.
- OPRES had no facility to analyse trends in preparedness ratings over time. Consequently, it was not possible readily to identify recurring problems, or monitor the impact of action to improve low ratings.

6.3 Two recent changes to NZDF structure and systems provide the means for the NZDF to address some of these limitations:

- a new Army Performance Management System (APMS); and
- the formation of a permanent Joint Forces Headquarters.
6.4 The APMS is designed to improve the efficiency and transparency of OPRES reporting. In addition, the APMS:

- should provide a more comprehensive picture of unit preparedness; and
- has the potential to provide a closer accountability link between the reporting of identified preparedness deficiencies and action plans to provide solutions and overcome capability shortfalls.

6.5 In turn, more transparent recording of preparedness status should enable the NZDF to analyse preparedness trends over time – thus providing a means of monitoring capability and identifying recurring problems. The performance management systems used by the Navy and the Air Force follow a similar framework to that of Army, but are not as fully developed. A corporate management system will link all three systems. This has yet to be introduced across the NZDF.

**Intelligence for Contingency Planning**

6.6 Limitations on New Zealand’s access to intelligence networks and product can pose risks to personnel and military assets and to the success of a military mission. The NZDF has noted that it faced impediments to some needed information. As part of INTERFET, the NZDF did not have unrestricted access to overseas intelligence through all available channels.

6.7 Any such restrictions potentially have detrimental impacts on military capability – including possible implications for strategic planning, force preparation and training. The NZDF, along with other relevant Government agencies, could usefully review its intelligence needs and access in light of the East Timor experience.

6.8 Planning for the East Timor operation confirmed the importance of maintaining effective interdepartmental relationships, in order to share information and ensure that different perspectives are considered in presenting advice to the Government.
Contingency Planning

6.9 Administration of the joint strategic planning function could be strengthened. The strategic Joint Planning Group did not have an explicit mandate and operated with a wide-ranging but largely undefined brief. The loose arrangement within which the Group operated created the potential for differing interpretations of its roles and responsibilities, and for conflicts with the roles of other planning groups.

6.10 The absence of systematic meeting records makes it difficult to follow the processes and deliberations that led to key courses of action and strategic decisions. Little documentation exists to transparently show the decisions that were made by the Joint Planning Group. This was also the case with decisions made by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Operational Planning

6.11 Due to time constraints, units preparing for deployment did not always receive the formal orders that would have provided useful confirmation of tasks and mission focus (along with detailed training requirements). The lack of such orders could result in misunderstandings over mission objectives or over what is required of unit commanders during preparation for deployment.

6.12 As far as possible, the time made available for operational planning should ensure the timely preparation and promulgation of warning and operations orders as the basis for practical guidance to deploying units.

6.13 On 1 July 2001, the NZDF established its Joint Forces Headquarters. The headquarters will provide a permanent structure for the joint operational planning and direction that was previously undertaken as required. A permanent structure will provide opportunities to maintain and enhance the NZDF’s joint planning skills and experience.
Pre-deployment Training

6.14 The NZDF’s experience of preparing for East Timor also highlights the importance of gathering reliable operational intelligence – thereby ensuring that training (and other aspects of force preparation) is based on an accurate set of assumptions and expectations. Because training personnel did not have sufficiently high security clearance, they were not able to approach coalition partners directly for information about the likely operating conditions for deploying personnel. Logistics planners faced similar information constraints.

6.15 NZDF trainers had only limited and general documentation on which to draw for developing training programmes for East Timor. Contingency training plans would have enabled pre-deployment training to have been developed in a more efficient and comprehensive manner. Training plans should be developed which are directly relevant to New Zealand’s force structure and likely employment contexts.

6.16 Time constraints limited the depth and breadth of collective training for East Timor, with planned battalion level exercises not being conducted before deployment. In addition, only limited exercises were held at a command and control level. Collective training should be a core component of ongoing training. Training needs to ensure that, when preparing for a deployment, personnel are familiar with operating within a larger military grouping.

Critical Item Deficiencies

6.17 As the NZDF got ready to prepare for a possible deployment, known equipment deficiencies represented significant capability shortfalls. Some key equipment (such as Army’s APCs and Land Rover fleet) was known to be at the end of its useful life – although the processes for acquiring replacement vehicles had begun. The purchase or enhancement of critical equipment was regarded as being essential to the protection of personnel and successful conduct of the operation.

6.18 The NZDF was able to address equipment deficiencies within the response times agreed with the Government. However, such capability deficiencies limited force options available to the NZDF, extended feasible response times, and generated potential operational risks. Shorter response times for future operations may present risks that are more difficult to manage.
The circumstances that faced the NZDF also point to a more general concern about planning for phasing out older equipment and acquisition of new capability. The planned time for phasing out older equipment and purchase of replacements compelled the NZDF at short notice to either purchase new equipment or overhaul existing equipment. As noted, this was a high-risk strategy.

Equipment planning is dictated by decisions within the NZDF and by the Government about capability expectations and competing demands for funding. The NZDF faces constraints in its ability to meet current and future equipment needs, including limited funds and competing Government priorities. The NZDF had to accept or mitigate a range of military risks resulting from the significant time span between phasing out old equipment and purchasing new capability.

**Strategic Lift Chartering**

The East Timor operation highlighted the significant risks – to both the NZDF and the Government – associated with securing charters to transport large numbers of personnel and equipment (see Figure 11 on page 62). While the NZDF was aware of these risks, and was successful in obtaining the necessary charters, it should ensure that it has in place procedures and clearly stated air and sea lift strategies to help manage these risks for future military operations.
Figure 11
Moving the Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st Sept</td>
<td>The first New Zealand troops were transported by Air Force Hercules and Boeing 727 aircraft. Eighty-eight troops departed on this date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Sept</td>
<td>A chartered civilian Boeing 747-400 aircraft transported troops and equipment of the Battalion Group to Darwin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Sept</td>
<td>The first ship chartered by NZDF was the MV <em>Edamgracht</em>. This ship carried 21 Armoured Personnel Carriers, 25 non-military vehicles and other equipment for the Company Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Oct</td>
<td>A second chartered ship, the MV <em>Edisongracht</em>, was needed to transport the remaining equipment for the Battalion Group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informing the Public

6.22 The NZDF has noted from its own process for identifying lessons learned that its public information strategy could have been more comprehensive, and that the strategy was not issued until almost three months after the Chief of Defence Force issued the related Directive. This meant that the strategy was not a fully integrated part of the earlier planning and the Force Commander’s considerations.

6.23 The NZDF does not have a single web site that provides comprehensive information on its operations in East Timor. The single Services’ web sites do not provide a comprehensive picture of the joint operation.
ISSUES FOR NZDF CONSIDERATION

Reporting to Parliament

6.24 We analysed the NZDF’s accountability documents (the Purchase Agreement, the Forecast Report, and the Annual Report) for the period from 1999-2000 to 2001-02. In our view, the documents provide insufficient information for the reader to:

- clearly understand the impact of the East Timor deployment on the NZDF’s ability to deliver all its outputs (particularly those associated with Army activities);
- develop an understanding of the changing focus of activities within the NZDF (for example, training) directly resulting from the East Timor commitment; or
- understand the cumulative impacts on the NZDF’s capability and preparedness over time.

6.25 The Purchase Agreement should reflect the true nature of the NZDF outputs being purchased by the Minister. The commitment of significant NZDF resources to East Timor in 1999 resulted in a shift of resources to the achievement of Output Class 16 (Military Operations), with a consequent impact on the achievement of other outputs. This change in the nature and balance of the outputs purchased did not result in corresponding amendments to the 1999-2000 Purchase Agreement.

6.26 Information that we gathered indicates that the East Timor operation is having a considerable impact on the activities and capability of the NZDF – in particular, on the Army. In our view, Schedule 4 to the Purchase Agreement – a classified document – could be used to address such issues, given their sensitive nature.

6.27 The Forecast Reports appear to be reproduced annually with little variation and little reference to the impacts of the East Timor deployment. We believe that the provision of additional appropriate information as part of Output Class 16 would go some way to addressing these shortcomings.

6.28 The NZDF has drawn lessons for financial management systems and practices from its East Timor experience. For example, the NZDF has identified the need to review its budgets to take account of factors such as leave entitlements and cost allocations for Territorial Force personnel.
Part Seven
Lessons Learned
LESSONS LEARNED

7.1 We expected the NZDF to have in place the means to identify and analyse lessons from the East Timor deployment. The collection, analysis and promulgation of “lessons learned” information is vital for continual organisational and operational improvement.

7.2 All three Services generate lessons learned information at a tactical, operational and strategic level – reflecting a strong culture within the NZDF of using experience in the field for continual improvement.

7.3 Each of the three single Services has reviewed its involvement in INTERFET. Lessons from the East Timor operation should be considered in the context of the particular circumstances of that operation and cannot be used as a template for all future capability planning across the NZDF.

The Navy

7.4 In early September 1999 HMNZS Te Kaha was diverted from an exercise near Singapore to join the INTERFET Task Group off East Timor. HMNZS Canterbury later relieved her.

7.5 Both ships were deployed at short notice, but at a high level of preparedness following an intensive period on exercises. The frigates carried out patrolling, escort and surveillance duties; while the tanker HMNZS Endeavour provided logistical support to the land forces and multinational naval task force.

7.6 Two main sets of issues arose from the post-operation reports on the performance of the three vessels – logistics support, and communications capability.

7.7 Supply chain problems were noted, with concern that insufficient priority had initially been given to the supply of spares and stores to the New Zealand naval component. Logistical problems were overcome when a New Zealand naval logistics representative was assigned to work as part of the coalition co-ordination team.

7.8 Concerns were also raised over the reliability of communications equipment – in particular, the limited capability to handle a large volume of message traffic and maintain secure communications.
The Air Force

7.9 The Air Force deployed transport aircraft, helicopters and associated personnel in support of the New Zealand deployment.

7.10 In June 2000 the Air Force published a report based on its involvement in the INTERFET operation. The report noted the effectiveness of communications between Air Command and the Joint Operational Planning Group as the NZDF made preparations to send a joint force to East Timor. However, for reasons of operational security, the Air Force’s helicopter Squadron had limited access to some detailed operating information that would have improved planning.

7.11 The June 2000 report identified the need to increase resources in areas of administration and air security, and observed the shortcomings of some communications equipment.

Army

7.12 Army has adopted a system to collect, analyse and promulgate lessons learned from operations and exercises. The system has the potential to strengthen the development of best practice across Army, ensuring consistency and continuous improvement.

7.13 In June 2000, Army set up a Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Since then, Army has gathered a large volume of data from a variety of sources – drawing on the experience of successive battalions deploying to East Timor. Observations and comments have been collated under relevant headings, producing a useful body of lessons learned information. Figure 12 on the opposite page shows how CALL works.

7.14 Army’s lessons learned system has produced immediate training benefits. Tactical lessons are used directly to refine training of subsequent battalions preparing to deploy to East Timor.

7.15 CALL has a wide-ranging brief, with overall responsibility for managing Army’s lessons learned system. We concluded that CALL is not, at present, adequately resourced to carry out its full range of tasks in an effective manner.¹ Nor are all information sources being used to identify possible lessons. As a consequence, opportunities to translate experience into improvements to policies and practices will be lost.

¹ CALL has only one shared full-time staff member.
### Centre for Army Lessons Learned

Collates Data and Identifies Problems, Assigns Responsibility for Rectification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information is collected and put onto unit's lessons learned databases. Unit Commander adds comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments are collated and Senior National Officer adds comments and summary of points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and review team compiles a report recording all observations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier fills in lessons learned booklet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL sends out questionnaire to Commanders of Force Elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and review team travels to East Timor and carries out validation of training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.16 CALL does not have an overview of operational and strategic lessons learned material generated within Army. By comparison with Army’s system for collecting tactical lessons learned data, the analysis and promulgation of operational and strategic lessons learned is not approached in a systematic way. In the absence of a system for analysing observations and following up on implementation, important opportunities to improve military practice may be missed.

7.17 Additional resourcing would enable CALL to take a more effective role in:

- analysing lessons learned information;
- reviewing and promulgating changes to doctrine, policies, and procedures; and
- pursuing lessons learned initiatives both within Army and with overseas counterparts.

7.18 Strengthening the analytical capability of CALL would enable Army to obtain the full benefits of the tactical lessons learned system for improvements in military practice.

Operational and Strategic Lessons Learned

7.19 Army has prepared a variety of reports that review operational and strategic aspects of the INTERFET deployment. These complement the tactical lessons learned system managed by CALL.

7.20 Army reviews have identified lessons from the East Timor deployment, including observations on:

- the joint planning process;
- preparedness timescales;
- training;
- transportation and supply; and
- force manning and structure.

7.21 A report prepared by Army General Staff in May 2000 provided the most comprehensive insight into strategic lessons from the deployment. The report addressed issues concerned with planning, command and control arrangements, logistics, and capability. Capability issues included:

- the need for more regular collective and combined training; and
- the risks posed by old and inadequate equipment.
7.22 The May 2000 report also noted that the planning effort was successful overall, and identified the importance of having an effective national command and control capacity to ensure a New Zealand point of authority and responsibility within a coalition force.

7.23 Such lessons learned reports contained useful comments, observations and recommendations for consideration at each level of the command chain within each single Service. However, not all steps in this evaluation process were documented in a formal, systematic and transparent way as issues were passed up the command chain.

7.24 Clear responsibility for documenting evaluations needs to be assigned within each Service as a central component of its lessons learned system. Failure to record the evaluation process at all levels of the organisation creates the potential for lessons to be lost, or having to be re-learned.

7.25 Usefulness of the NZDF’s lessons learned systems would be enhanced through a systematic approach to the review of key functions and capabilities across the deployed force, including:

- medical support;
- equipment repair and maintenance;
- communications capability;
- management of stores and supplies; and
- personnel welfare.

7.26 Such reviews would provide a valuable source of lessons learned information for continual improvement and best military practice.

7.27 At present, each Service operates its own lessons learned system. There would be value in the NZDF establishing a joint lessons learned framework. This framework would facilitate the sharing of lessons learned among the single Services and promote best practice for Services working together.
Glossary of Terms
Collective Training

Training takes place at two levels – collective and individual:

Collective training involves soldiers and force units exercising within a larger group (as sections of ten, or a platoon, or a company) to perform defined tasks such as reconnaissance, patrolling and live firing. Collective training also promotes skills in the management of command and control structures.

Individual training is designed to develop a person’s competency in a defined skill area, such as shooting, tracking or driving. This training generally takes place in a classroom or in a controlled training environment.

Combined Operations

Operations conducted by forces of two or more allied nations in co-ordinated action toward common objectives. The INTERFET force was a combined operation.

Command and Control

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, co-ordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

Directed Level of Capability

The level of capability that the NZDF is funded to maintain in order to provide the Government with options for the commitment of a military force.

Doctrine

A fundamental set of commonly understood principles that guide the use and actions of a military force or force elements in support of strategic objectives.
Employment Contexts

Descriptions of representative and illustrative security events for which there is a likelihood that the Government would expect to make a military response should the events occur.

Force Element

A unit which directly contributes to the delivery of an NZDF output, e.g. a frigate or an infantry company.

Joint Force

A force consisting of force elements from more than one Service. The New Zealand force included elements from all three Services.

Logistics

The movement and supply of troops and equipment. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of material; and
- movement, evacuation, and hospitalisation of personnel.

Military Capability

The ability to achieve a specified military objective. The major components of military capability are force structure and preparedness. Force structure comprises the personnel and equipment assembled in force elements for military tasks.

Mission-essential Tasks

Tasks which are fundamental for the performance or accomplishment of the force element’s mission within the given employment context.
**Operational Level of Capability**

That state of preparedness where a force element is ready, combat viable, deployable and sustainable.

**Orders – Warning and Operational**

A **Warning Order** is one of a number of orders and directives issued in anticipation of an operational deployment. A Warning Order alerts force elements to the likely mission and intended outcomes, and outlines those preparatory tasks that need to be undertaken.

An **Operational Order** confirms or amends a Warning Order, and specifies in greater detail the range of tasks that the deploying force will be expected to perform in the course of the coming mission. Operational Orders provide guidance and direction on timelines for force preparation – including arrangements for mobilisation and the scope and focus of pre-deployment training.

**Preparedness**

Preparedness is a measure of the ability of force elements to be employed on military tasks. Force elements must be held at a level of capability from which they can be raised to an operational status within a specified time, then deployed for the conduct of a particular type of military task and be sustained for a specified period while engaged in that task. The state of preparedness for particular military tasks is specified in terms of readiness, combat viability, deployability, and sustainability.

**Readiness**

The current proficiency and effectiveness of a force element or force to conduct a range of activities. Force element readiness comprises personnel, trained state, equipment held, and equipment condition. Combat viability is a component of preparedness.
**Response Time**

The time available, once committed by the Government, to prepare a force for deployment to a particular area of operations. The response time should give the force time to assemble and concentrate its personnel, stores and equipment; undergo additional individual and collective training; and carry out specific planning for operations.

**Sustainability**

The ability to support a designated force at operating tempo through the duration of an operation. Sustainability includes the availability of replacement personnel, equipment maintenance, and the ability to keep force elements supplied with the necessary stocks.